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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
Ann., Sec

pursuant to u-_.

78 2a 3(2} (:I ).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Standard of Review
wil ] n o t b e u p s e t

A t ria. 1 rourt' s awar^ of custody

" a b s e n t a show i IKJ ol am ijbi l s e of

manifest injustice,"

Mauahan v. Mauahan, 7 70 P..2d 156 (Utah App.

1989) . Here there has been such an abuse <-• discretion because
the Court's findings are not rat-innallv based
See Martinez v Martinez, 72 8 P..:: -:M
be rati ona] 3 y supported by evidence •
1.

Child custody,

• :e.

*-;ah 19 86) (findings must
Jie record) .

... ""ourt abuse ifs discretion

in awarding custody of the parties' childrer? to plaintiff:
a.
By failing to consider une best interests of
the children?
b.
By erroneously finding that: plaintiff wis t:he
children's primary caretaker?
c.
By relying on the sixteen-month-old report: of
Elizabeth Stewart and speculating as to what each
parent would have to offer the children i n their teen
years?
d
By ignoring the past conduct and demonstrated
mora ] standards of each of the parties?
e
By failing to consider which parent was more
likely to provide the other with frequent, continuing
contact with the children?
f.
By committing a series of reversible
evidentiary errors and by refusing to consider evidence
of witness tampering involving the use of firearms and
death threats against defendant?
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.

Section 30-3-3 0, Utah Code Ann i
(1) In determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past
1

conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each
of the parties.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds relevant,
which parent is most likely to act in the best
interests of the child, including allowing the
child frequent and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent.. ..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case and Disposition Below.

Appellant disputes the trial court's award of custody of the
parties' three minor children to plaintiff.
2.

Factual Background.

("defendant") is a physician.

Appellant Andrew Baldwin

Appellee Susan Baldwin

("plaintiff") is a psychiatric nurse.

Shortly before she met

defendant in 1985, plaintiff abandoned her first marriage,
complaining that her husband did not meet her emotional needs.
In 1987 she became pregnant with defendant's first child and made
arrangements to abort her pregnancy.

Defendant persuaded

plaintiff to get married and have the child instead.

They were

married on September 18, 1987. This was defendant's first
marriage.

Their son, Will, was born May 23, 1988. Two more

children were born to the marriage, Barbara and Andrew.

At the

time of trial, the children were aged 5, 2 and 1, respectively.
Beginning in 1990, defendant was employed by FHP Health
Care as a critical care physician in the intensive care units at
St. Mark's Hospital and Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City.
His position as the attending physician allowed him to spend most
of the day at home with the children, responding by telephone to
questions from the hospital.

R. 2967.

2

Late in 1.991, plaintiff :nr.* defendant discussed moving
to the

- r-: r

Detroit, Michigan area.

encouragement, defendant- Lender*

•

••

plaintiff's

•

- 1

accepted a position as an assistant professor y medicine a*:
Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan

; -

parties' third fluid, Andrew, was boin Ju
signed a verified complaint for divorce against defendant ^ . ;.i.y
6, 1992. On July ^.

992, completely unaware that plaintiff was

seeking a di vorce, defendant traveled to Mi chigan t:< ::» make an
offer on a home that the parties had selected together.1
R. 2987.

On

plaintiff cal -

'

I), 1994, after defendant had made this offer,
defendant and informed him that sh

for divorce and taken the children to Ohio 2

R

2987-89.

Defendant immediately returned to Utah and
unsuccessful ly attempted to regain his position at FHP.
Plaintiff returned with the children approximately two weeks
1 ate

to it: €' zoned ] e

defends lit rented

both parties to use as a second residence
first month of this arrangement, defendant

marital residence with the younger children

idoirri nii i iirt f o r
^;3-90

F<

H

e

ypically spent the

Occasionally

wniie planning the divorce, plaintiff went on a house
hunting trip to Michigan, applied for a Michigan nursing license,
instructed defendant to make an offer on a specific home, and
filled out the mortgage application, with no intention of moving
to Michigan. R, 2649 and R. 2980-87.
2 plaintiff also sought temporary custody of the chili n.
Neither her verified complaint nor her verified motion for
temporary custody contained a single negative allegation against
defendant. Her representations to the Court, however, changed
dramatically as the case developed.
3

defendant stayed in the marital residence with all three children
while plaintiff stayed alone at the condominium.

R. 2991-92.

Each morning, defendant and Will went back to the marital
residence to spend the day with all of the children.
On the afternoon of August 17, 1992, defendant advised
plaintiff that he would never voluntarily relinquish custody of
the children.

Plaintiff responded that if he did not do so, he

"would never withstand the scrutiny," a statement that defendant
understood, correctly, as it turned out, to be a threat to his
character and reputation. R. 3000-01.
Plaintiff immediately began to falsely portray
defendant as violent, abusive and mentally ill, in stark contrast
to her earlier descriptions of him in counseling as a "kind" man
who was a "good husband and a good father."3

R. 2628 and 2773.

On August 18, 1992, when defendant arrived at the house with
Will, he discovered that plaintiff had changed the locks on the
family's residence, locking both him and Will out of the house.
On the same day, plaintiff sought a restraining order against
defendant, claiming "fear" that defendant would physically harm
her and the children.4

Ex. 17.

The Court immediately granted the restraining order,
denying defendant access to the marital residence until
3

Shortly before filing for divorce, plaintiff told her
counselor that defendant "rarely gets angry with me." Ex. 23.
4

Plaintiff claimed that her "fear" had begun seven months
before when defendant repelled a burglar from the family home
while plaintiff and the children slept. This was the first
mention of fear by plaintiff, and it came eleven days after she
asked defendant to keep all three children overnight at least
once a week and to help bathe and put the children to bed every
evening before departing. Ex. 23, p. 26 and R. 2664-65.
4

September 4, 1 992.

At that time, defendant discovered that his

medical office had been ransacked, with patient files and.
persona] effects si: ;i ewn abou! ,

u\. <;M" tfH 0 00 i n casti and

diamonds which defendant had received from his mother had been
taken

Plaintiff later admitted searching tihe office and taking

docuineni b , one a I. win i < ,li wdin a 1 Lered HOY,! pi:oi"luoed aw a t r i a ]
exhibit.

R. 3232-36 and Ex. 53„

the cash u

Plaintiff never accounted for

diamonds.

(

aptenibei

"I o , i ^'92

I, It^

'".YUJI,

l, .JIWaided L.emporary

custody of the children to plaintiff.
3.

The Custodial Evaluation,

conducted a. custodial evaluati
parties twice.

r*

Elizabeth Stewart

-

t- saw ili<>

She did not see the parties outside of her

office, and she never saw plaintiff alone with the children.
;258.

As r>art- of her evaluation, Di

WtuwaiL gave Una par Lies

: h-r Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-IT

("MMPI-II") , a

psych atric test that is relied on widely by the psychiatric
profession, and the Rotter Sentence Completion Test, a simple
exercise requiring the parties to complete unfinished sentences.
Dr. Stewart submitted the parties' MMPI results for
third-party analysis, and she received a narrative report
indicating that defendant's profile was. norma] in all respects.
ci-x.. 2.
T

^

rxctinLj.j-j.-e profile, however, was profoundly abnormal.

disclosed that she had been dishonest on, the test, avoiding

answers to questions that she thought would indicate personal

p r o b l ems a nci fa i I iaiqs ,

N e v e r t h e l e s s , pi a i rit: \ f:f ilranonst r a t e d a

"4-9" psychopathic deviate profile, which i s a well-understood
personality disorder characterized by impulsiveness,
5

manipulativeness, unsatisfiable dependency needs, a tendency
toward family and marital problems, vulnerability to frustration,
an inability to appreciate personal failings, pathologic blaming
of others, and an inability to change.5

Ex. 3 and R. 3151.

Dr. Stewart discarded both MMPI profiles, instead
relying on her subjective impressions of the parties.6

R. 2303

(!f[E]ither I had to assume the interview was incorrect, or the
test was incorrect.
error.")

And I concluded that the test was in

Describing the parties in terms that were wholly

inconsistent with their conduct and their psychiatric profiles,
Dr. Stewart recommended that plaintiff be awarded custody of the
children.
4.

Plaintiff's temporary custody of the children.

During her fifteen month tenure as temporary custodian of the
children, plaintiff was completely overwhelmed, describing her
home as "chaos" and complaining to her therapist that she was
being "victimized" by her four-year-old son.7

R. 3283 and Ex.

23, p. 36. She became alarmingly dependent on surrogate care,

5

Dr. Mirow, a psychiatrist who was acquainted with both
parties, testified that she would be "very concerned" about the
person that produced plaintiff's profile, R. 2786-87, and that
people with this kind of profile "look very, very good, they are
smooth." R. 2398. Dr. Stewart admitted that plaintiff's psychopathic deviate score places her above the 90th percentile of the
reference population. R. 2398.
6

Subsequent events proved her impressions to be terribly

wrong.
7

Her problems with the children were apparent to almost
every witness. Dr. Goldsmith, a psychologist that saw plaintiff
with Will, said nothing positive about plaintiff's parenting
skills. Dr. Stewart testified that plaintiff was overwhelmed by
the children, R. 2360, as did plaintiff's therapist, Margaret
Thompson. Ex. 23.
6

leaving the children at day care almost every day °ven on her
days off, while denying defendant's repeated requests to allow
1:

0.
During this period, plaintiff unnecessarily moved twice

within a year , once immediately after advising the Court: and Dr.
Stewa] : t that she had just: renewed tiie lease

in lief" "" \o\ rely" hoine

to ensure that the children would have a stable environment.
Ex. 19 and R. 2 707,

Making good on her threat - .- malign

defendant; ' s unblemished i.epnt, atn un, who i:ai I •"
least five times with false complaints against defendant.
Plaintiff a,,-: explored other tactics,
let

•

..^

^rv- accused defendant

. :

declared overnight visitation between defendant and Will
"inappropriate,"

suggesting sexual misconduct,

R

2756. She

threatened defendant wi th char ges of misprescribd ng na n coti cs
R. 2993.

She told the children's pediatrician, D r . Young, that

defendant was • alcoholic,
leinoLely subt .

Ex 26. None of these charges was
were event, I;IHI I. I,y abandoned. 8

idled,

Most troubling, plaintiff threatened defendant that she
would make Will
custody

l

^

* as he needs • • -e" for hen to ga i n
i ii: ( j n " therapyl" and

:K

described such difficulties v

wi

behavior that

diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
ten

WIILULI

was
("ADHD"),

In. win otedieaLed wilit increasing dosages < • . , ;alin.

Dr. Mirow testified that "[defendant] was being pushed
out as almost a dangerous, almost evil sounding person.... That
was not accurate
There was no reality in that." R. 2764-65.
7

5.

The trial. A six day trial began in October 1993

and ended in January 1994. Dr. Stewart's recommendation was
sixteen months old, and there was virtually no evidence that
supported plaintiff's parenting abilities. Despite testimony
from experts that (1) Dr. Stewart's report had serious flaws, (2)
that plaintiff's psychological profile displayed personality
disorders that would make her a poor choice for the custody of
the children, and (3) that her actions were consistent with her
abnormal profile, and despite extensive testimony from defendant
and others that the children were well-adjusted and content in
his custody, the Court awarded plaintiff custody of the children.
In doing so, the Court failed to acknowledge
plaintiff's past conduct, her demonstrated moral standards and
her continuing efforts to obstruct defendant's relationship with
his children, while at the same time ignoring a large body of
evidence that showed defendant to be a caring, competent parent
who was deeply committed to his children.

This was clear error.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
The Court abused its discretion by accepting
Elizabeth Stewart's stale and badly flawed custody evaluation
without conducting a reasoned, independent determination of which
party would best serve the interests of the children.
Many hours of testimony from defendant and others
established that defendant had structured his life around his
children, willingly sacrificing professional opportunities to be
with them and to care for them.

Defendant gave detailed

testimony about his relationship with each of his children.

He

explained their differences and he introduced many examples of
the stimulating play and learning exercises he engaged them in.
8

He described the limits that he imposes on the children, the
structure and, when necessary, the discipline.
Plaintiff's testimony, on the other hand, lacked any
indication that she had a meaningful relationship with the
children.9

Instead, she described the problems she was having

with the children, her extensive need for day care and outside
help with the children, her need to medicate Will with Ritalin,
and her own unsatisfied emotional needs.
The Court ignored this evidence. Virtually every
finding reflects the Court's unquestioning adoption of Dr.
Stewart's report.

Ignoring facts confirming the accuracy of the

plaintiff's profoundly abnormal and defendant's healthy
psychiatric profiles, the Court speculated that plaintiff would
have more to offer the children, the oldest of whom was five, in
their teen years.

Court's Ruling dated March 2, 1994, p. 5 (R.

1281).
2.
The Court abused its discretion by ignoring
mandatory factors that weighed heavily in favor of defendant.
The Court also ignored statutory factors that must be
considered in determining the best interests of the children,
specifically which parent would be more likely to permit frequent
and continuing contact by the noncustodial parent and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the parties, both of
which were critical in this matter.
Plaintiff's approach to visitation was to take every
opportunity to obstruct defendant's relationship with his
9

Plaintiff's description of her relationship with the
children would occupy less then one page of the trial transcript.
It can be found at R. 2485 and 2489.
9

children.

This was disregarded by the Court. Most troubling,

the Court ignored uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff, after
threatening to make the parties' four-year-old son "as sick as he
needs to be," carried out her threat by describing such
behavioral problems to health care providers that Will was
hastily diagnosed with ADHD and prescribed Ritalin,
Will's two day care providers, a local merchant and a
nurse, all of whom were well-acquainted with Will, described him
as a normal, happy and well-behaved child at day care and in
defendant's company.10

(Depositions of Katie Slaymaker and

Gretchen Jervah, admitted at R. 2825; Testimony of Betty
Campbell, R. 2977; Testimony of Shauna Shiflett, R. 3056).

At

the same time, plaintiff was able to manage Will only with
increasing dosages of Ritalin.

The Court, ignoring plaintiff's

express threat to harm the boy, defendant's special expertise as
a physician, and the testimony of these witnesses, found that
defendant had placed "his own wishes ahead of the best interest
of his children" by disputing the diagnosis of ADHD and by
doubting plaintiff's veracity.

This was a manifest abuse of

discretion, and it totally ignored the central component of any
custody dispute, the children's best interests.
3.
The Court abused its discretion by excluding
important evidence that went to the heart of this dispute.
Finally, the Court abused its discretion by making
erroneous evidentiary rulings, which served as the basis for at

10

To supplement his own testimony, defendant provided
sixteen hours of video tape of Will, unmedicated, playing quietly
alone and with his siblings during periods of visitation with
defendant. R. 3393 and Ex. 65.
10

least three of the Court's findings, by excluding critical
rebuttal evidence, and by refusing to consider serious criminal
activity that occurred during the trial that circumstantially
implicated plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN TO PLAINTIFF

The critical issue in any custody case is the best
interests of the children.

Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38

(Utah 1982); Sec. 30-3-10(1), Utah Code Ann.

The court must

consider many factors, all of which essentially go to the needs
of the children and the ability of the parents to meet those
needs.

Painter v. Painter. 752 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1988).

Here

the weight of the evidence showed that defendant's ability to
meet the needs of his children, and his commitment to doing so,
far exceeded plaintiff's.
A review of the record shows that plaintiff continued
to be overwhelmed by her children, that she was unable to meet
their physical or emotional needs, and that her conduct was
wholly consistent with her grossly abnormal psychiatric profile.
The evidence reveals a glaring absence of any positive testimony,
regarding her relationship with her children or her parenting
skills.

Even her own expert described her relationship with her

son as "troubled."

Plaintiff is a chronically depressed,

emotionally disturbed woman who manipulated those around her
without regard to the consequences.

Rather than acknowledging

her shortcomings, she blamed defendant and her children, accusing

11

her four-year-old son of being "manic-depressive"11 and
"victimizing" her, causing him to needlessly suffer a psychiatric
diagnosis that may have life-long implications.
In contrast, the record is replete with evidence that
defendant's first priority has been and continues to be his
children, and that he is particularly well-suited to caring for
them without outside assistance and without the need to
administer psychiatric medications to any of them.
Except for findings 6 and 9, which are factual
recitations, the findings relating to custody (findings 5 through
25) are either wholly unsupported or substantially outweighed by
the record.

Findings 18, 19 and 20 are based on faulty

evidentiary rulings.

Findings 5 through 11 are discussed as a

group, and findings 12 through 25 are discussed separately.

To

the extent necessary, the findings are also broken down to enable
defendant to properly marshal the evidence in support of the
findings:
Finding 5.
Part 1. Susan Baldwin has been the primary caretaker
of the three minor children throughout the marriage of
the parties. She was the exclusive caretaker of Will
from his birth until Barbara's birth on July 31, 1991.
The evidence supporting this finding is plaintiff's
testimony and the testimony of Dr. Stewart.
53; R. 3105-06.

R. 2593-97; R. 2950-

It was sharply disputed.

Part 2. Shortly after Barbara's birth when the Plaintiff discovered she was pregnant for a third time,
Defendant, at Plaintiff's insistence began providing
some care for Will.
11

Defendant testified that a manic-depressive five-yearold would be "a case for the textbooks." R. 3020.
12

The evidence supporting this finding is plaintiff's
testimony at R. 2954.

The evidence was conflicting on the

question of which parent was the children's primary caretaker,
but the findings that defendant provided no child care duties is
not supported by the record.

R. 2499.

Part 3. While the Defendant provided physical care for
Will in terms of playing with him and taking him with
him for various activities, he did not perform any
other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning,
purchasing clothing or food, household chores, taking
the children to medical appointments or other daily
activities involved in child care. The Plaintiff
provided all of these services for all three children.
The Defendant at no time provided care for either
Barbara or Andrew.
The evidence supporting this finding is plaintiff's
testimony at R. 2593-97. Dr. Stewart also stated that defendant
"played" with Will while plaintiff ran the house.
Finding 6.

R. 3104.

Finding 6 is not disputed.

Finding 7. After each of the children was born, Will
in 1988, Barbara in 1991 and Andrew in June of 1992,
the Defendant left town leaving the Plaintiff to cope
by herself with the problems of a new child, and after
Barbara's birth, with children who were already residing in the home. This occurred despite the fact that
the date of each child's birth was known in advance.
The Defendant put pursuit of his own interests ahead of
those of providing care for the children (Will, or Will
and Barbara) when Barbara and Andrew were born.
This recitation of factual events is supported by the
record at R. 2318, 2367, 2414-15; R. 2500-02, 2506-08, 2641-45;
R. 2936-40. There is nothing in the record to support the
finding that defendant left plaintiff to cope with a newborn
child "by herself."
Finding 8. Each of the parties can provide some personal care for the children, but it is the Plaintiff
who has a history of using her time to provide personal
care for the children while the Defendant has used this
time for his own pursuits.
13

The evidence in support of this finding is the
testimony of plaintiff, R. 2593-97, and the testimony of
Elizabeth Stewart, R. 3105-06.
Finding 9.

Finding 9 is not disputed.

Finding 10.
Part 1. Defendant has never provided personal care for
Barbara and Andrew for longer than a weekend which
occurred during the pendency of this matter.
This finding is a reiteration of Findings 5 and 8.
reflects by Dr. Stewart's 1992 recommendation.

It

Ex. 1, p. 22.

Part 2. In addition, Defendant has, during the pendency of this matter, frequently changed his visits as
he accepted work assignments around the country.
There was no evidence to support this finding.
Part 3. He was unable to identify a future work schedule in court. He stated it would be unpredictable.
Consequently, Defendant's theoretical ability to provide personal care is questionable.
On the last day of trial, defendant was unable to
recite his future work schedule in court, R. 3346.

He never said

his future work schedule was "unpredictable."
Finding 11.
Part 1. The Defendant has never provided personal care
for Barbara or Andrew while the Plaintiff has regularly
scheduled her shifts to provide custodial care for all
three children.
This is a reiteration of Findings 5, 8 and 10.
Part 2. During the pendency of the matter the
Defendant would not accept regularly scheduled
visitation because he declared his work prohibited him
from doing so.
Defendant refused to accept "regularly scheduled"
visitation when it coincided exactly with his work schedule.
This was no accident; shortly after defendant had given plaintiff
14

a schedule of his employment two months in advance, plaintiff
"scheduled" defendant's visitation on all of his working
weekends, effectively denying him contact with his children.
R. 3030.
Part 3. His uncertain and irregular schedule with
unpredictable times in which to provide personal care
is a pattern that continued throughout the pendency of
this action.
This finding is not supported by the record.
Part 4. In addition, the Plaintiff testified that when
he had personal time free during the course of the
marriage, while the parties resided together, Defendant
frequently used this for research and writing rather
than providing care for the children. The Defendant
did not dispute this testimony regarding his use of his
time.
Plaintiff's testimony on this issue is at R. 2500,
2506-07.

Defendant disputed this by showing a commitment to his

children beginning before they were born.
dissuaded plaintiff from aborting Will.

It was defendant who
It was defendant who

began collecting toys for the children prior to their births. It
was defendant who painstakingly hand-painted hundreds of wooden
blocks for his children, R. 3046 and Ex. 36, and it was defendant
who constructed the array of hanging bells for Barbara and Andy.
R. 3198 and Ex. 50.

Even more important, while defendant

welcomed every opportunity to care for the children, plaintiff
proved herself to be incapable of caring for them on her own.
The essence of Findings 5 through 11 is twofold:
(1) plaintiff was the primary caretaker of the children, and
(2) defendant was largely disinterested in the children.

The

court attempted to buttress this by finding that defendant
provided care for Will only at plaintiff's "insistence," and that

15

defendant's care consisted primarily of play while plaintiff
performed the household chores-

The weight of the evidence does

not support the specifics of these findings, or their essence.
Regarding which parent was the primary caretaker of the
children, the testimony concerning the time prior to the parties'
separation was conflicting.

Plaintiff asserted that defendant

may have "helped" with child care duties. Defendant testified
that household duties were shared.

Plaintiff did the cooking.

Defendant washed the dishes and cleaned up after meals.
Defendant bathed Will and almost always put him to bed.

R. 2952-

54.
In the sixteen months in which plaintiff had temporary
custody of the children, however, her patterns of child care
clearly established that she was not giving the children personal
care.

Instead, she was leaving the children at day care on her

days off while repeatedly denying defendant contact with his
children.

R. 3031. Rather than using his time for "his own

pursuits," defendant willingly sacrificed a medical school
professorship that he had sought for two years to be with his
children.
More important than who performed household chores is
the parties' level of interest and commitment to their children.
The Court suggested that defendant is neither capable nor willing
to make his children a priority, while going far in its efforts
to reach the opposite conclusion for plaintiff.

The record,

however, is replete with evidence of defendant's caring and
successful relationship with his children.
Findings 18 and 19, infra.

See discussion of

In contrast, there was virtually no
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positive testimony from plaintiff regarding her relationship with
the children.
While she had temporary custody of the children,
plaintiff used vast amounts of day care, sixty hours per month
beyond what was needed to cover the hours she worked.
55.

Ex. 6, 9,

Defendant was astonished that plaintiff would leave the

children in day care on her days off while refusing his requests
to care for them.

R. 3050.

The children spent so much time in

day care that they saw their mother little more than defendant,
who was allowed to take them only on alternating weekends. Ex.
55 and tr. 6, pp. 89-90 (R. 3339-40).

At no time did plaintiff

offer contradictory evidence on this issue.
As to defendant leaving after the births of the
children, the record can not support the Court's conclusion that
defendant put his own pursuits ahead of those of his family.

The

birth of each child occurred at unavoidable times of transition
for the family, such as a move associated with a change of jobs
or defendant's medical certification examinations.

R. 2937-38.

These were not fishing trips. Defendant was present for the
birth of each child, and he insured that plaintiff had recovered
from childbirth and had surrogate care available to her before
attending to other needs of the family.

R. 2502.

The necessity

of each trip was discussed by the parties and agreed to in
advance.

Plaintiff testified that "intellectually, I could

understand what he was saying, that he needed to go and find a
house so we wouldn't arrive in Baltimore and not have a home."
R. 2496.

When asked about defendant's leaving after the births

of the first two children, Dr. Stewart testified that the trips
17

were vital to the economic security of the family and should not
be criticized.

R. 2413-14.

Regarding defendant's work schedule, defendant never
said his work schedule was "unpredictable."12

The Court may

have confused plaintiff's testimony, in which she said that her
scheduling was "very erratic," for defendant's.

R. 3428.

Although defendant could not recite his work schedule to the
Court on January 10, 1994, he had no reason to fix his work
schedule.
was.

Only his visitation schedule had to be fixed, and it

This finding implies that plaintiff had a more stable work

schedule than defendant, which was not true.

Plaintiff and

defendant both worked irregular schedules, which would preclude
either from a fixed schedule of visitation.

R. 3426 (plaintiff

could be required to work any day or evening).
Rather than having a "questionable" ability to care for
his children, defendant testified that his work schedule was
totally at his discretion.

R. 3009.

Defendant testified that he

could easily coordinate his shifts with the children's school and
child care, and that he would likely limit himself to three
shifts per week to maximize his time with his children.
10, 3242-43.

R. 3009-

The Court abused its discretion in using

defendant's discretionary work schedule to suggest that his
parenting ability was "questionable."
Finally, there is no evidence that defendant
"frequently changed his visits" to accommodate his work schedule.

12

Defendant's only use of the word "unpredictable" was in
describing a typical on-call day at FHP, where he worked from
1989 to 1992. R. 2968.
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Plaintiff's counsel's suggested to defendant that he had changed
visitation "numerous" times, but defendant disputed this
assessment.

R. 3347.

Plaintiff did not testify on this issue.

Finding 12.
Part 1. In determining the stability of the environment provided by each parent, the Plaintiff is clearly
capable of supplying a much more stable environment
than is the Defendant.
This finding is derived from Dr. Stewart's testimony.
R. 2883; R. 3105-07.

It is discussed following the recitation of

parts 4 and 5 of this finding.
Part 2. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the only mental health
professional who examined both the parties and their
children on behalf of the court, was clear and unequivocal in testifying that it was the Plaintiff who could
provide a stable, emotional environment for the children, not the Defendant.
This finding recites an opinion that Dr. Stewart
reached almost a year-and-a-half before trial, based on two brief
interviews in her office.

R. 2260-62, 2332-33. Unfortunately,

the sixteen months which elapsed after Dr. Stewart saw the
parties proved her to be totally wrong, and by ignoring these
events the Court's finding is in error.

This is discussed in

detail following the recitation of part 4.
Part 3. The behavior of the parties in the court during the trial confirmed the information provided by
Dr. Stewart. The Plaintiff remained calm and provided
information for the court. The Defendant became highly
agitated and had difficulty keeping himself under
control. On occasion the court had to admonish him or
request the assistance of his counsel in keeping the
Defendant under control so that the proceedings could
continue. The Plaintiff presented non-accusatory
information to the court about the experiences and
parenting of the parties. The Defendant was accusatory
and attacked the Plaintiff.
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On the last day of trial, during Dr. Goates's cross
examination, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Goates whether Will's
pediatrician had done a sufficient workup to confirm Will's
diagnosis of ADHD.

Defendant unconsciously shook his head "no,"

and the Court admonished him as follows:
Dr. Baldwin, I wonder if we could get you to
sit in some kind of decorous, professional
way. It's not impressive to me to have you
shake your head and make nonverbal gestures.
R. 3387.

This was the only time the Court "admonished"

defendant, and counsel was never asked to keep defendant "under
control."
Similarly, there is no evidence that defendant was
accusatory, or that he "attacked" plaintiff.

As to who

criticized and attacked whom, consider:
(1) Plaintiff accused defendant of misprescribing
narcotics, R. 2993-94, a claim she abandoned;
(2) Plaintiff falsely advised the Court that
defendant would physically harm her and the children,
Ex. 17;
(3) Plaintiff presented forged photocopies of a
document she had taken from defendant's medical office
as evidence at trial, stating that she had put the
original "back in the trash," R. 2857-58;
(4) Plaintiff falsely claimed that the children
had been returned from visitation "bruised," R. 2698.
A medical examination disproved this accusation, R.
2703-04, and she abandoned it;
(5) On September 11, 1992, plaintiff made the
frightening threat to make her own child "as sick as he
needs to be" to win custody, a threat she carried out.
R. 3018;
(6) Plaintiff called the police with false claims
against defendant several times during the pendency of
the case, the most well-documented being the carefully
planned "911" call when she asserted, falsely, that an
unknown intruder was breaking into her house. R. 2833;
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(7) Plaintiff, a psychiatric nurse, falsely told
her therapist that defendant was paranoid, delusional,
psychotic and schizoid. Ex. 24;
(8) Plaintiff falsely told Dr. Goldsmith that
defendant had a "tentative11 relationship with his
children and that Will was afraid of him. R. 2460; and
(9) Plaintiff falsely told Dr. Young that defendant was an alcoholic. Ex. 26, p. 3.
Part 4. In addition, the psychological testing of the
parties, as described by the mental health professionals, as well as the clinical observations by
Dr. Stewart indicated that while people and relationships are important to the Plaintiff, impersonal ideas
are important to the Defendant.
This part of Finding 12 reflects Dr. Stewart's reliance
on the Rotter Sentence Completion test, a simple fill-in-theblank exercise in which the parties complete sentences on a form.
Ex. 1 and R. 3094.

Unlike the MMPI-II, which is virtually

impossible to "fake," the examinee in the Rotter test consciously
chooses the themes to express.

R. 3092-93.

A manipulative

person, therefore, knowing what themes are expected in a custody
evaluation, will tailor her responses for the occasion.
Plaintiff's responses were carefully aimed toward family and
children.

For example, plaintiff's response to

!I

I like ..." was

"playing with my children," (Ex. 40) (yet she put them in day
care on her days off) while defendant's response to "I like ..."
was "to kayak in the jungle."

(Ex. 41).

Dr. Stewart, who analyzed this test herself, embraced
plaintiff's responses as evidence of her abiding concern for
family and children and, apparently, as evidence of defendant's
lack of interest in his children.

The Court's adoption of this

conclusion reflects a conscious disregard of the evidence flatly
contradicting her assessment.
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Because this finding reflects the Court's total,
unquestioning acceptance of Elizabeth Stewart's custody
evaluation, apparently without even considering the evidence, a
detailed discussion of the Stewart report, and its deficiencies,
is necessary.
a.

The report was stale.

Dr. Stewart's report was sixteen months old at the time
of the trial. Dr. Stewart had no knowledge of the many
significant events that occurred after she interviewed the
parties in September 1992, and she noted that the passage of time
was critical:
function."13

"[T]he issue of custody should be based on current
R. 3133. This passage of time proved many of Dr.

Stewart's assessments wrong by the time of trial.14
example:

For

"Mrs. Baldwin's plan to stay at home is better than

Dr. Baldwin's plan to move away."

Ex. 1, p. 7.

As previously

discussed, plaintiff moved shortly after falsely advising Dr.
Stewart and the Court that she had just renewed her lease.
Defendant did not move away as predicted by Dr. Stewart. Also,
Dr. Stewart concluded, "Mrs. Baldwin is more able to give personal rather than surrogate care."

Ex. 1, p. 3.

From undisputed

13

When asked what the effect of placing Andy in defendant's custody would be, Dr. Stewart replied "I don't think I'm in
a position to say, because I haven't seen Andy for a year." R.
3121. Dr. Stewart also acknowledged that her assessment could
change if she learned that plaintiff was having difficulty coping
with the children (which she was), R. 2382-82, or if she discovered that plaintiff had made numerous false claims against
defendant (which she had). R. 2417.
14

Dr. Stewart made some perceptive errors as well. For
example, she repeatedly mistook "obsessive" for "depression,"
which caused Dr. Mirow to wonder aloud whether she was hearing
people correctly. R. 2770.
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testimony, it was clear that plaintiff resorted to day care, even
on her days off, to the point that she was home, alone with the
children, no more than five or six days per month, ex. 6, 9, 55.
Despite the many events that had proven Dr. Stewart's
report wrong, the Court accepted it without considering the
testimony, straining at times to avoid obvious inconsistencies.
For example, even Dr. Stewart stated that plaintiff was "severely
taxed" by the children, and would be for several more years.
Instead of recognizing this, the Court ignored it, stating that
"the Court must consider not just the parenting skills each
parent evinces with the children at present, but also what each
parent can offer the children ... in the children's adolescent
and teen years."
1281).

Court's Ruling dated March 2, 1994, p. 5 (R.

This was a manifest abuse of discretion.

b.
Dr. Stewart's rejection of both MMPI profiles
undermines the validity of her report.
Dr. Donald Strassberg15 testified that the MMPI is far
and away the most frequently used instrument in psychology,
having been given to thousands of people over forty to fifty
years.

R. 3140-46. Dr. Strassberg testified, and defendant's

MMPI narrative profile shows, that defendant gave truthful
responses, R. 3146-47 and Ex. 2, and that his psychiatric profile
was normal in all respects, R. 148-49 and Ex. 2.
Plaintiff's profile, on the other hand, revealed a
deeply disturbed woman who would be a poor choice for the

Dr. Strassberg is a professor of psychology at the
University of Utah, R. 3137. Unlike Dr. Stewart, he has published many peer-reviewed papers on the MMPI and its interpretation. R. 3138.
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guardianship of small children.

R. 2786-88. Dr. Strassberg

testified that plaintiff has a classic "4-9" personality
disorder, which is characterized by impulsiveness,
manipulativeness, unsatisfiable dependency needs, a tendency to
family and marital problems, vulnerability to frustration,
inability to appreciate failings of self, pathologic blaming of
others and an inability to change, even in therapy.

R. 3150-51.

Manipulation of clinicians (which would include Dr. Stewart) is
also a common characteristic of this profile.

R. 3153.

In light of plaintiff's psychiatric profile, and
defendant's repeated warnings to Dr. Stewart that she was being
mislead,16 R. 3317-23, Dr. Stewart should have been alerted that
there were serious problems with plaintiff's credibility.

Yet

Dr. Stewart accepted virtually everything plaintiff told her.
R. 2330-31 (!1I have to . . . defer to her judgment ... on the basis
of her experience with him").
Dr. Stewart's rejection of the parties' MMPI profiles
is stunning.

Consider the marked contrast between Dr. Stewart's

observations of each of the parties as compared to their MMPI
narratives:

Dr. Stewart was very impressed when, during the interview, plaintiff stood and announced that Will had to go to the
bathroom. R. 2270. As she led Will, who had been playing at
defendant's feet, out of the room, defendant told Dr. Stewart
that Will had said nothing, and that she was being duped. R.
3320-21.
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COMPARISON OP STEWART CUSTODY REPORT AND MMPI NARRATIVE
SUSAN BALDWIN
MMPI Narrative (Ex. 3):

Stewart Report (Ex. 1):
1.

Risks and Rewards:

"She is not afraid to take
risks which have a high pleasure potential."

2.

"The client is likely to be
impulsive and immature and
tends to seek immediate gratification of her wishes, often
without apparent concern for
the consequences."

Social Interaction:

"Socially Mrs. Baldwin is very
much at ease with others. Her
upbeat, 'can-do' manner and
general efficiency impress
others as indicative of being
responsible, forgiving, and
understanding."
3.

"Her behavior is primarily
hedonistic and self-centered,
and she is quite insensitive
to the needs of other people,
manipulating them for her own
ends and feeling no guilt
about this."

Self Image:

"While sensitive to what others think of her and to her
own security, she does not
easily attribute fault or
blame to other people. She
worries about the events in
her life but in a productive
rather than a ruminative way."
4.

"She is likely to project an
excessively positive selfimage and to be somewhat arrogant and intolerant of others'
feelings. The client is likely to be rigid and inflexible
in her approach to problems
and may not be open to psychological self-evaluation."

Honesty:

"She has a tendency at the
present time to see herself as
being without blame and always
motivated to do the correct
thing. This may be an artifact of the custody evaluation
inasmuch as she is trying very
hard to acknowledge no faults
lf
nor (sic) frailties
5.

"[T]he client attempted to
place herself in an overly
positive light by minimizing
faults and denying psychological problems. This defensive
stance is characteristic of
individuals who are trying to
maintain the appearance of
adequacy and self-control....

Therapy Prospects:

"Although she has used counseling a great deal, she has
not done so because of insecurity about her own abilities

"Although she may say she
wants treatment ... she has
little or no motivation for
personal change and is likely
to enter treatment only to
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avoid or reduce external pressure .fl

but rather to understand herself and others better."

COMPARISON OP STEWART CUSTODY REPORT AND MMPI NARRATIVE
ANDREW BALDWIN
Stewart Report (Ex. 1):
MMPI Narrative (Ex. 2)
1. Truthfulness:
"The MMPI ... shows strong
denial of any depressive symptoms ." "[H]e was trying to
produce a sane MMPI and overdid it." R. 2309.
2.

"This is a valid profile. The
validity items suggest he
cooperated with the evaluation
... this is an adequate indication of his present personality functioning."

Interpersonal Relations:

"Dr. Baldwin is not socially
inclined and, in fact, he
feels some discomfort with
others."
3.

"He appears to meet and talk
with other people with relative ease and is not overly
anxious when in social gatherings ."

Emotional Stability:

"mood disorder"

Normal.

"depression" (ten times)

Normal.

4.

Other observations:

"rigid"

Normal.

"insensitive to the emotional
needs of other people"

Normal.

"a potential threat ... there
is some question whether Mrs.
Baldwin's concern about her
safety was undue."

Normal.

"vulnerable to frustration"

Normal.

"high strung and irritable"

Normal.

Certainly, any psychological test can be inaccurate
17

17

Dr. Stewart justified her rejection of defendant's
normal MMPI profile by surmising that he manipulated the test.
R. 2388. Dr. Strassberg, however, testified that it is virtually
impossible to do so and that even psychology graduate students
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Plaintiff's conduct throughout this matter, however, was entirely
consistent with her psychiatric profile. As examples,
Dr. Strassberg listed her inability to handle Will, indicating
low frustration tolerance, R. 3167, the way she planned and
executed the divorce, indicating manipulativeness and poor
judgment, R. 3168, her statements about being "victimized" by her
four-year-old son, indicating a tendency to blame others for her
failings, R. 3170, and her false statements concerning
defendant's tendency to violence, illustrating dishonesty.
R. 3171-72.
Dr. Strassberg also discussed the problems that could
be expected in the from a custody award to a person with
plaintiff's profile.

These include the parent being overwhelmed,

R. 3162, which plaintiff had already demonstrated, decisions
being made without considering the interests of the children, and
nonfulfillment of the children's emotional needs caused by
pathologic dependency needs. R. 3162-63.
c.
Dr. Stewart disregarded serious problems that
plaintiff was having with Will.
Dr. Stewart noted, but disregarded, remarkable
differences in the way Will interacted with each of his parents.
Defendant and Will met with Dr. Stewart on August 31, 1992, when
Will was living with defendant.

Will was quiet and content

during that meeting, and Dr. Stewart made only positive comments,
noting that Will was "very comfortable with father," enjoying
can not successfully manipulate the test. R. 3174-75. Dr.
Stewart's unfamiliarity with the basic principles of the MMPI was
illustrated when she misnamed the MMPI frequency scale as the
"falsification scale," R. 2304, a term which, according to
Dr. Strassberg, does not exist. R. 3174.
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"good rapport," "on lap playing with father's care, father very
tolerant."

R. 2381. On September 11, 1992, shortly after Will

had been placed in plaintiff's custody, Dr. Stewart saw Will with
plaintiff.

At this meeting, Dr. Stewart described Will as

disruptive and "quite demanding."

Ignoring the placid and happy

demeanor that Will had demonstrated in his father's custody, she
testified at trial that Will had emotional problems.18

R. 2269.

Dr. Stewart's failure to consider that Will was happy
and quiet with one parent, and demanding and disruptive with the
other, undermined the credibility of her report.

Beyond that, of

course, in the ensuing sixteen months plaintiff's difficulties
with Will worsened, which was not even considered by the Court.
d.
Dr. Stewart erroneously characterized defendant as
suffering from "depression" and "mood disorders."
In her report, Dr. Stewart referred to defendant's
"mood disorders" and "depression" eleven times.

Ex. 1. Dr.

Mirow rejected this diagnosis and was puzzled as to how Dr.
Stewart got this information.

R. 2768-69. Defendant did not

give Dr. Stewart a history of depression either.

R. 3240-41.

This incorrect information became central to Dr. Stewart's
report.

Her reliance on this "fact" begins in the summary

section of her report: "[Plaintiff] ... is emotionally more
stable than Dr. Baldwin, whose history of mood disorders produces
difficult challenges for him."

Ex. 1, p. 1.

18

At trial Dr. Stewart said it was "very clear" to her
that Will had emotional problems when she saw him in September
1992. R. 2271. This observation differed substantially from her
report, however, in which she indicated that there were no
special needs or problems that would set one child apart from the
others. Ex. 1 and R. 3075-76.
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After making eleven references to defendant's
depression, Dr. Stewart ignored plaintiff's well-documented
history of depression dating to at least 1985. R. 2843.
Plaintiff discussed her depressive history with Margaret
Thompson.

Ex. 24. She described herself as "chronically

depressed" to Dr. Mirow.

R. 2738.

There is no reference to

these problems in Dr. Stewart's report, however, who instead
described plaintiff's "upbeat and can-do manner."
e.
Dr. Stewart mischaracterized defendant's offer to
continue caring for Will as an attempt to separate the siblings.
In the early months of this case, defendant's only
priority was to preserve the integrity of the family.

At that

time he had been Will's primary caregiver for over a year.
2954-55.

R.

Hoping to salvage his marriage and family, he offered

to continue this arrangement to relieve plaintiff of her bad
relationship with Will.

Dr. Stewart ignored defendant's

motivation for this proposal and instead seized upon it as
demonstrating that defendant had a favored child.

Ex. 1, p. 7.

Even though plaintiff had requested this arrangement, Dr. Stewart
interpreted it as evidence that "Dr. Baldwin has shown less
interest in Barbara than he has in Will."

Ex. 1, p. 7.

She also

failed to recognize the necessary converse--that plaintiff had
shown less interest in Will than in Barbara or Andy.
f.
Dr. Stewart strained to portray defendant's
positive traits as negative, and plaintiff's negative traits as
positive.
Dr. Stewart persistently described defendant's positive
traits in a negative way, and plaintiff's negative traits in a
positive way.

Dr. Strassberg agreed, stating the Dr. Stewart was
29

"unreasonably selective" in the features of the parties' MMPI
profiles that she chose to pay attention to.

R. 3157. For

example, Dr. Stewart considered defendant's sensitivity to other
people's expectations as a negative trait.19

R. 3301 (while

simultaneously characterizing him as insensitive to other
people's needs.

Ex. 1, p. 7).

Regarding the MMPI testing, Dr. Stewart interpreted
defendant's "true" response to question 37 of the MMPI as
evidence of his "vulnerability to frustration."

R. 3086.

Plaintiff's "true" response to the same question, however, was
ignored.

R. 3086-87. Similarly, Dr. Stewart found it important

to report that defendant allegedly paid little attention to
Barbara in Dr. Stewart's office on September 11, 1992.

Ex. 1.

At trial, however, Dr. Stewart related that Barbara was "quite
self-sufficient," R. 2270, requiring very little attention from
either parent.

Dr. Stewart also failed to report that plaintiff

gave no attention to Andy whatsoever, who was fed and held by
defendant throughout the interview.

R. 2377.

In other words, as

to identical facts, one was important, the other ignored,
depending on whether the predetermined conclusion was supported.
g.
Dr. Stewart's ex parte communications with
plaintiff's counsel should have disqualified her report.
Dr. Stewart's report was tainted by her substantive
ex parte discussions with plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Dolowitz.
19

R.

When forced to allow that defendant had any positive
traits, Dr. Stewart managed to present them as additional handicaps: (1) He has sophisticated humor, which he uses to maintain
emotional distance from other people. (2) He is accurate with
facts and details, which is socially problematic. (3) He is a
well-motivated person, not by the ioy of planning, work, and
accomplishment, but by fear of failure. Ex. 1, pp. 6-7.
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2220.

The special risk to Dr. Stewart's objectivity in this case

is the nature of Mr. Dolowitz's statements concerning defendant,
a man he had not yet met.

On August 19, 1992, seeking a

restraining order against defendant, Mr. Dolowitz personally
represented to the Court that "Defendant's behavior has
demonstrated that the Defendant may physically injure the
Plaintiff ... and the children."20

Mr. Dolowitz delivered this

document to Dr. Stewart on August 28, 1992, before Dr. Stewart
met defendant.

Mr. Dolowitz also had numerous telephone

conversations with Dr. Stewart, telling her that defendant was on
Prozac, which was incorrect, that defendant had attempted to
terminate plaintiff's phone service, which was incorrect, and
that defendant had cancelled visitation, which was also
incorrect.

R. 2245-46.

Although Dr. Stewart listed her contacts and procedures
in her final report, including her discussions with Dr. Mirow,
Margaret Thompson and the children's pediatrician, R. 2239-41,
she failed to disclose her communications with Mr. Dolowitz,
giving defendant no opportunity to respond to Mr. Dolowitz's
statements about him.

R. 2245-46.

It was only when defendant's

counsel requested additional files from Dr. Stewart, two months
after Dr. Stewart's final report was submitted to the court, that
defendant discovered evidence of these ex parte communications.
Part 5. The children must be raised in an environment
where they and their relationships to their parents,
their peers, their families and each other are important. The Plaintiff is the parent who can create an
environment in which these will be emphasized, main20

Attorney's Certification for Temporary Restraining Order
dated August 19, 1992, para. 4 (R. 67-69).
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tained and taught. These are extremely important in
the emotional stability of the environment maintained
for the children. A custodial parent must provide comfort and security for a child and by personal care and
using friends in a social environment, the Plaintiff
has given the children an environment of adult caring.
The Defendant did not provide such an environment and
is unable to do so.
This finding is supported by Dr. Stewart's testimony at
R. 2277, where she indicates that she thought plaintiff was "very
empathetic," and that defendant "doesn't sense a lot of the
feelings that other people have."21

The finding that plaintiff

was better able to provide a "stable, emotional environment" of
adult caring" could only be reached by disregarding the facts.
The vast majority of "adult caring" given to the children, at
least when they were in the custody of plaintiff, was day care.
Plaintiff has a long history of mental instability, she has
abandoned two marriages, and she has been in various emotional
treatments since at least 1985.

R. 2843.

She sought to abort

Will, and she considered the same fate for her third child,
Andy.22 R. 2931 and 2503.
Finding 13. While defendant clearly loves all the
children and has a great deal to offer these children,
the court finds that he is not equally bonded to the
three children. Dr. Stewart clearly opined that
Plaintiff would make the better custodial parent for
21

Dr. Mirow disputed this assessment of defendant, testifying that "he's playful, thoughtful, interactive, quite adept at
reaching other people emotionally. And he is able to use his
knowledge and his understandings, both to play and to learn in a
very healthy way. Which would make him a pretty good parent."
R. 2749.
22

Dr. Goates, a psychiatrist, considered this fact particularly important, indicating that the mother of an unwanted child
may view that child as "damaged goods," creating a negative
relationship between herself and the child, R. 3278, which was
evidenced by plaintiff's complaints to her therapist that she was
being "victimized" by her four-year-old son. R. 2843.
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the three children and is strongly and equally bonded
to all three. The Court finds this testimony to be
credible.
The unsupport statement on parent-child bonding is
discussed at Finding 19, infra.
Finding 14. The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that
she is very concerned when one parent alienates children from the other parent. She found, and the court
has determined from the testimony of the parties and
their conduct in court that Dr. Stewart correctly
observed that the Defendant works to alienate the children from the Plaintiff by fault finding, criticism and
derogatory comments. On the other hand, the Plaintiff
does not engage in this behavior.
Plaintiff testified that defendant once accused her of
being a "poor role model" in Will's presence.

R. 2516. Dr.

Stewart's incorrect assumption that defendant would alienate the
children from plaintiff was not based on any direct evidence.
Instead, it was based on a single incident at the custodial
interview.

There, plaintiff stated that she thought extensive

and flexible visitation was appropriate.

Recalling plaintiff's

deposition the previous week, however, in which plaintiff had
suggested that defendant was mentally ill and should have no
contact with his children, defendant called this discrepancy to
Dr. Stewart's attention.

R. 3317-18. Dr. Stewart characterized

plaintiff's dramatic change in position "a matter of wording
differences, not substantive differences,"
defendant he was being "hypertechnical."

R. 2261, and told

Defendant then annoyed

Dr. Stewart by questioning her competence.

R. 3318. Based on

defendant's directness, Dr. Stewart wrongly concluded that
defendant would be "antagonistic" toward plaintiff in front of
the children, and this became the basis of finding 14.
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The evidence in contrast to this finding is Defendant's
testimony in which he stated that he never used derogatory terms
about plaintiff in front of the children.

R. 3194. As to

plaintiff's fault finding, criticism, and derogatory comments
about defendant, please refer to the discussion of Finding 12,
part 3, supra.
Finding 15. The Court found the defendant's testimony
concerning the Park City outing to be particularly
significant in this context. "When defendant, en route
to Park City, experienced problems with his vehicle, he
walks in distance in the sun/heat with the children,
decided to keep the children with him overnight and
chose not to call the plaintiff directly to seek
assistance with the children, or to advise her of where
he and the children were and what his plans were.
Defendant's testimony regarding the Park City outing is
at R. 3037-42. Defendant notified plaintiff, via another
physician, that he was having problems with his automobile, which
he was, and that he would return the children the following day,
which he did.

Id.

Finding 16. The 911 tape was considered compelling by
the Court. The content and tone of the tape reflected
an alarming degree of persistence, angry demands,
intense poundings on the doors, and chaos, at the home,
to which the children were insensitively subjected.
While both parents might well have handled this
situation differently, keeping the best interests of
the children at the forefront of their minds, it is
particularly clear that defendant lost control and
forgot what was best for the children.
The 911 tape is Exhibit 31. The evidence was that
plaintiff was expecting defendant to arrive at her home at 10:00
p.m. to pick up Will to take him to a drive-in movie.

Plaintiff

testified that she knew defendant would arrive at that time to
pick up Will.

R. 2831. He arrived at plaintiff's residence at

approximately 9:50 p.m.

Plaintiff's car was in the driveway and
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the lights were on.

He knocked.

There was no answer, but a dog

began to bark from inside the house. Defendant became alarmed
because he knew plaintiff did not own a dog.

R. 2915-17.

Fearing that something could be wrong inside the house,
defendant knocked more persistently and began calling for Will.
Plaintiff was inside the house, ignoring defendant.

R. 2832.

She called 911, feigning to the police that an unknown intruder
was "breaking into" the house.23

R. 2833.

There is no evidence

that defendant "lost control." When the police arrived, no
action was taken, except that plaintiff did successfully deny
defendant visitation that evening.

R. 2918.

Finding 17. Defendant acknowledged, while on the
stand, that the plaintiff has been flexible regarding
visitation in the past.
Defendant said that plaintiff had "sometimes" been
flexible with visitation.

R. 3022.

This single statement does

not reflect plaintiff's approach to visitation, which is
discussed at Part II of this brief, infra.
Finding 18. Dr. Stewart described the difference
between playing with and entertaining the children as
opposed to providing every day structure and care. She
testified that the structure a care giver would give
would produce more resistance from a child than would
simply playing with the child, yet this care giver
providing structure would be providing more attention
to the children than someone who simply played with the
children. The Plaintiff is aware of the problems that
arise from her providing structure for the children.
The Defendant, not providing this type of structure,
does not encounter this type of difficulty. The Plaintiff provides limits for the children and this produces
conflicts. The Defendant does not. Instead of recognizing that this is a problem, the Defendant simply
criticizes the Plaintiff to the children, which is a
23

After admitting to the police that it "might be my exhusband, " plaintiff falsely informed them that defendant had
"broken into my house before." Ex. 31.
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de-stabilizing factor in their lives. The lack of this
criticism in the home of Mrs. Baldwin is one of the
stabilizing factors in the children's lives as it
leaves them free to form an unfettered relationship
with their father. Dr. Baldwin does not permit the
children this freedom in their relationship with Mrs.
Baldwin. This conduct by Dr. Baldwin is detrimental to
the children.
The evidence supporting this finding again is Dr.
Stewart's testimony, which was based on two brief interviews a
year-and-a-half before trial.

R. 3104-08. There was no evidence

that plaintiff provided any limits or structure for the children.
She described her five-year-old son as a hyperactive "special
needs" child, R. 2865, but she gave him slingshots to play with
without supervision.

R. 2836.

She testified that Will needs

"one-on-one" time, R. 2559, but she left him at day care on her
days off.

Ex. 6, 9, 55.
Defendant testified at length about the time he spends

with his children and the things they do together.

Examples are

constructing paper bracelets, working on jigsaw puzzles, playing
chess, playing checkers, learning to use a computer, learning
colors, letters and numbers with antique license plates, R. 3049,
learning to sew, making kites, camping out in the back yard,
painting rocks for gifts to family members, cooking dinner
together, watching planes at the airport, going to the park and
making framed pictures.
and 65.

R. 3326-35 and exhibits 37, 38, 49, 54

Plaintiff did none of these things with the children, or

anything else that can be discerned from her testimony.
Defendant also described the rules and structure that
he provided for his children, painfully relating two incidents in
which he had to discipline his son for stepping off the curb
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without checking for traffic.

He described the "red tape" rule,

where household items that posed potential hazards, e.g.,
electrical outlets, were carefully marked with red tape to
designate that they were off-limits to children.

R. 3216 and

visible in Ex. 40. The Court's finding that defendant does not
place limits on the children is particularly disturbing because
the Court cut short his testimony on this issue.
of this brief, infra.

See Section III

Nevertheless, the only party who testified

regarding the limits and structure that was given to the children
was defendant.
Finding 19. Will is strongly bonded with both parents.
Andrew and Barbara have strong bonding with the Plaintiff and weak bonding with the Defendant. The Defendant has not demonstrated an ability to provide care
and supervision in a suitable environment for the
children and meet their needs for a prolonged period of
time. The Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to
provide care and supervision in a suitable environment
for the children and meet their needs throughout their
lives.
The finding on parent-child bonding is unsupported by
the record.24

Regarding defendant's ability to provide care for

the children, Dr. Stewart's preposterous opinion was that
defendant was unaware of what the care of an infant entailed,25
even though it was defendant who fed and cared for the baby
throughout the interview.

Ex. 1.

24

Dr. Stewart admitted that she was in no position to make
any conclusion as to the current level of bonding between the
parties and the children. R. 3127.
25

Dr. Mirow disputed Dr. Stewart's assessment, pointing
out that defendant's duties as an intensive care physician were
"very similar" to those of taking care of a baby. R. 2778.
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The testimony revealed that only defendant had a deep,
meaningful bond with each of the children.26

He developed this

bond through extraordinary efforts. Unlike plaintiff, defendant
discussed in detail the way he interacted with each of his
children, even the infant, Andy, whom defendant frequently
carried around like a papoose.

He took the children to the flea

market virtually every weekend because each of the children
enjoyed it for different reasons.

R. 3045.

He took them to see

the mine at Kennecott, and to Hill Air Force Base to see the
airplanes.

Id.

He covered an entire wall of a room in his house

with white felt so that the children could play "stick-um" with
the colored pieces of felt he gave them.

R. 3050 and Ex. 39.

Finding 20. The Defendant attempted to involve Will in
the custodial dispute. He has advised Will that he
(Will) will be placed in the Defendant's custody, thus
trying to impact Will's preference for which parent he
would reside. The Plaintiff has engaged in no such
activity. This activity is considered to be seriously
detrimental to Will.
There was no evidence on which the court could have
based such a finding.

Plaintiff attempted to testify that Will

told her that defendant told him he was going to be placed in
defendant's custody.

R. 2561. Over defendant's hearsay

objection, the court admitted it as evidence of the child's state
of mind, but not for the truth of the statement.27

Id.

This

26

Dr. Mirow testified that defendant was "easily a person
who can be with small children on a nonverbal level," R. 2779.
27

The Court's evidentiary rulings on the child's "state of
mind" apparently depended on who was testifying. When defendant
attempted to testify why Will thought he could not live with
defendant, for the purpose of showing that plaintiff had involved
the children in the dispute, the Court ruled that the child's
state of mind was irrelevant. R. 3194-95. When defendant
attempted to testify as to why Will thought he had to take his
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finding, which accepted the statement as substantive evidence, is
contrary to the Court's evidentiary ruling, and it is
inappropriate.
Finding 21. The law favors keeping siblings together.
The Defendant initially wanted custody of Will but not
Barbara or Andy. His position changed only as he went
into trial, apparently after determining that he would
not be able to successfully secure a separation of the
children. These three children should be kept together
in a family unit. The Plaintiff has sought custody of
all three children throughout this action and has constantly maintained the position that the children
should be kept together in a family unit.
Except for the statement that "the law favors keeping
siblings together,11 this finding is wrong.

In his first plead-

ing, defendant sought custody of all three children: "Based on my
professional opinion of plaintiff's emotional state, I believe
that the safety and physical well-being of my minor children is
at risk, and that it is imperative that an order be entered
immediately awarding me the custody of our three minor
children...."

Affidavit of William Andrew Baldwin in Support of

Cross Motion for Temporary Custody dated August 19, 1992, para.
17 (R. 36-48) (emphasis added) (judicial notice of all pleadings
was taken by the Court at R. 2660).

He never proposed the

separation of the siblings except as an alternative, temporary
measure when he believed reconciliation was likely.

Defendant

testified that "I believed that by doing that, ultimately the
family would reconcile."

R. 3213-14.

Defendant's alternative proposal was treated by
plaintiff, by Elizabeth Stewart and by the Court as an attempt to
separate the siblings. Dr. Mirow indicated that defendant only
Ritalin, the Court ruled that it was inadmissible hearsay.
3209.
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R.

wanted to "keep things together in the least disruptive [way] for
his family."

Defendant recognized the importance of keeping

children together, and he steadfastly sought custody of all three
children.

R. 2780.
Finding 22. Dr. Stewart advised the court that she
found the character and emotional stability of Susan
Baldwin as a custodial parent greatly exceeded that of
Andrew Baldwin. No credible contrary evidence was
presented to the court. The court finds that Susan
Baldwin has, in terms of her character and her emotional stability for providing custodial care for the
children, emotional stability and an ability to provide
an emotionally stable environment which greatly exceeds
that of the Defendant.
Dr. Stewart's testimony in support of this finding is

at R. 2293-95 and in her custodial report, Ex. 1.

Rather than

making a reasoned, independent finding based on the evidence, the
Court blindly accepted Elizabeth Stewart's erroneous
observations.

Contrary to the Court's finding that "no credible"

evidence was presented that defendant's character and emotional
stability was at least equal to plaintiff's, Dr. Susan Mirow, a
psychiatrist that had seen defendant sixteen times, testified
that defendant is emotionally "quite healthy," and that he is a
thoughtful, interactive parent that is "quite adept" at reaching
other people emotionally.

R. 2736, 2749, 2768.

As to the parties' character, the Court heard
uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff had planned the divorce
for maximum advantage, inducing defendant to quit his job and
sending him to Michigan to sign a real estate contract two days
after she had signed a verified complaint for divorce. Most
frightening, the Court heard undisputed testimony that plaintiff
threatened to make Will "as sick as he needs to be" for her to
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gain custody, and that shortly thereafter Will was being given
Ritalin for ADHD.

R. 3018).

Despite the fact that Will

exhibited no behavioral problems when he was outside of
plaintiff's presence, plaintiff testified that Will was a
"special needs child," justifying her complaints that she was
overwhelmed.
Finding 23. The Plaintiff has demonstrated throughout
the lives of the children a major commitment to custodial parenting. The Defendant has engaged in a playmate role with his son Will but not even that with the
other children. While the Plaintiff returned to work
on a part time basis after the birth of the children,
the Defendant worked full time and utilized his spare
time to conduct research for the publication of articles rather than assisting with the children. In addition, the Defendant was, until trial, perfectly willing, and in fact, requested the court to separate the
children. The desire and commitment for custody is
clearly differentiated between the parties. The Plaintiff has sought custody of all the children throughout
these pleadings, while the Defendant does not. In fact
he advised the court in his January 10, 1994 testimony
that he in reality wanted the Plaintiff to raise Barbara and Andy until they reached school age and then he
would assume physical custody.
Plaintiff testified at R. 2596 that defendant played
with Will but not with Barbara.
Most of this finding repeats Findings 18 and 21, which
have been discussed above.

On January 10, 1994 defendant's

testimony was that his primary goal was to have custody of all of
the children, that long blocks of visitation would be appropriate
until the children entered school, and that alternatively, the
younger children could reside with plaintiff in a joint physical
custody arrangement until they entered school.

R. 3344.

Finding 24. The Defendant on several occasions created
scenes that were emotionally disturbing to the children. He physically took the children from the Plaintiff in January of 1993 when Plaintiff did not agree to
that visitation and attempted to take them again with41

out her agreement in June, 1993. Prior to the filing
of the divorce, he ran his bicycle into the family car,
then told Will (untruthfully), who was in the car driven by the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had hurt him and
that he had to go to the hospital. Even the Defendant's own witnesses testified that this was totally
inappropriate behavior.
This finding reflects plaintiff's testimony at R. 252428 that defendant "took" Will in January 1993 when she attempted
to cancel visitation.

Defendant testified that Will darted

through the doorway as plaintiff was slamming it, leaving Will
outside in the snow without a jacket.

R. 3027-29.

There is no evidence that defendant "attempted" to take
the children in June 1993. This incident has been discussed at
finding 16. Regarding the bicycle incident, defendant testified
that he accidentally hit the car at "two or three miles an hour."
Neither the bicycle nor the car was damaged.

R. 3218. To make

light of the incident, and not to scare his son, defendant yelled
"crash" as he and Will had done many times before in the game
they called "crash."

R. 3219. Defendant testified that rather

than being frightened or confused, Will was "laughing his head
off."

R. 3219. Defendant's "own witness," Dr. Mirow, did not

testify that this behavior was inappropriate, only that it would
be inappropriate to intentionally scare your own child in this
manner, which defendant had not done.

R. 2805.

Finding 25. The Defendant refused to consider the
problems that Will suffers which have been diagnosed by
competent medical and psychological professionals to be
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. The Defendant insists this does not exist, and went to great
lengths to prove that this did not exist before the
court. This has placed Will in the position of receiving input from one parent that there is a problem with
which he must deal, while the other parent denies that
it exists. The need of a child suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is for stability,
42

predictability, and consistency in their environment.
The Plaintiff is capable of providing this environment.
The Defendant is not. The Defendant has demonstrated
an inability to accept this diagnosis. From the
court's perception, this is not an issue the court is
going to decide, nor need it decide it in terms of
reaching a factual determination. It does not decide
whether or not Will suffers from Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder. What the court does find, is
that the Plaintiff after consulting with appropriate
medical and psychological experts, determined that a
problem existed and followed the professional advice
she received in caring for Will. Instead of working
with Plaintiff (the parent having temporary custody)
the Defendant actively undermined and opposed the
prescribed treatment thus demonstrating a desire to
place his own wishes ahead of the best interest of his
children even after consulting Dr. Frances Berger who
tentatively confirmed the diagnosis and tried to counsel the Defendant about his reaction to this information.
This finding is supported by the testimony of Elizabeth
Stewart, R. 2321-23 and 3107-08, Dr. Goldsmith, R. 2438, 2442-45
and 2462-63, plaintiff, R. 2559-60, 2581-83 and 2850-51, and Dr.
Berger, R. 2900.

It assumes, by ignoring plaintiff's express

threat to make her own son "as sick as he needs to be,11 that Will
has an emotional problem, and it concludes that plaintiff is
better able to provide Will a structured, stable environment than
defendant.

The Court abused its discretion in making this

finding.
The Court's statement that "plaintiff after consulting
with appropriate medical and psychological experts, determined
that a problem existed and followed the professional advice she
received" is perplexing.

The undisputed testimony was that

plaintiff did not consult with anyone until after she threatened
to make her four-year-old son "as sick as he needs to be,"
R. 2841-43, strongly suggesting that Will's emotional problem was
wholly contrived by plaintiff.
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The only competent medical testimony came from
defendant, a board certified physician who has prescribed Ritalin
many times, and Dr. Delbert Goates, a psychiatrist specializing
in ADHD.

Defendant testified that Ritalin is a powerful drug

that is very similar to methamphetamine.

R. 3207.

He testified

that it should not be given to children below the age of six, and
that it should only be given as a last resort, after attempts at
nonmedical intervention have been exhausted.

R. 3204-07.

Defendant testified that the decision of Dr. Goldsmith
to recommend that Will be put on Ritalin was reached too quickly
because, of three environments in which Will was observed (with
plaintiff, with defendant and at school), problems were reported
in only one (with plaintiff), strongly suggesting that Will's
problem, to the extent it existed at all, was environmental
rather than emotional.

R. 3205-06. Defendant was particularly

concerned that Dr. Goldsmith had "diagnosed" Will entirely on
plaintiff's complaints, without first consulting with defendant,
Will's day care providers or a physician.28
Dr. Goates agreed with defendant.

R. 3205-06.
He testified that he

rarely places a child on Ritalin before the third grade, R. 3276,
and that he had not seen or heard sufficient information to place
Will on medication.

R. 3276.

Dr. Goates also noted that if a

child is misbehaving in specific circumstances rather than

28

Dr. Goldsmith admitted that he usually requires an
observation period of two to three months before resorting to
Ritalin, but that he recommended the immediate use of Ritalin to
"calm down the stress at home between Will and his mother." R.
2467.
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general circumstances, it would be appropriate to treat the
circumstances rather than medicating the child.

R. 3201-09.

Defendant testified that structure and attention is
often all that is required to remedy behavioral problems in
children,29

R. 3207, and that, after considering the potential

side effects of the drug, which include stunted growth and
elevated blood pressure, there were deeper reasons to avoid it:
At a crucial point in the young man's life or
young woman's life as the case may be, when
the child is forming their self-image, when
the child is learning to be part of society,
when the child is learning that, you know,
they are an okay person ... by giving them
this pill you create a situation where they
are special, they're different.
And my view would be that if you're going to
put a four-year-old or five-year-old in a
situation where all the other kids are just
kids, and he has to take his pill, then you
have to have exhausted all the non-medical
interventions first.
R. 3208.

Dr. Goates had similar concerns: "[Medication is] for

the benefit of the child, not for the teacher or the parents.
It's to protect the child's self-esteem and his growth."

R.

3276.
Defendant then testified that it is inappropriate to
give a child Ritalin unless the child has problem behavior.
2307-08.

R.

Dr. Goates agreed, stating that "I frequently give

parents considerable latitude in skipping or not using any dose
whenever they can."

R. 3296.

Defendant testified that, because

Dr. Goldsmith agreed that poor parenting skills can
aggravate the behavior of a child with ADHD tendencies, R. 223435, and he stated that he was uncertain whether the problems
described by plaintiff were caused by plaintiff or by Will. R.
2450.
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Will was well-behaved when in his care, Will did not need to be
medicated.30

To support his testimony, defendant offered many

hours of videotape of the supposedly hyperactive Will playing
quietly, unmedicated, during visitation with defendant.

Ex. 65.

Plaintiff's counsel objected on the ground of relevance.

The

Court, completely missing the point, ruled as follows:
I am willing to listen to this testimony because I think, whether or not a parent gives
medications that have been prescribed and
follows the medical advice of treating physicians is highly relevant. I am considering
it in that regard.
R. 3210.

In finding that defendant "place[d] his own wishes

ahead of the best interest of his children," the Court ignored
competent medical testimony that it is inappropriate to
administer Ritalin to a child that does not need it.

This was

clear error.
II.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING
CRITICAL FACTORS THAT WEIGHED HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT AS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT

The Court failed to consider which parent was more
likely to provide the children with "frequent and continuing"
contact with the noncustodial parent, and it failed to consider
the parties' past conduct, as it is statutorily required to do.
Section 30-3-10(2), Utah Code Ann., Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922
(Utah App. 1992).

Plaintiff's conduct has been discussed

throughout this brief, and it should have disqualified plaintiff

30

Dr. Stewart's lack of understanding of this drug was
illustrated when she stated that defendant's failure to administer Ritalin to Will evidenced his "insensitivity to the needs of
others." R. 2274.
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from consideration for being awarded the custody of the parties'
children.

Her approach to visitation was equally troublesome:
1.
On September 10, 1992, the day she was
awarded temporary custody of the children, when she
cancelled visitation, vaguely claiming that all three
children were "sick." R. 3026.
2.
Later that month, she prevented defendant
from moving his possessions from their home until after
the lease had expired, knowing that defendant therefore
would be forced to remove "rooms full" of possessions
the following day, which was a visitation weekend. R.
2881, 3023-24.
3.
On January 5, 1993, plaintiff cancelled
visitation with Will when defendant arrived late after
a major snowstorm. Hearing that he would not get to
see his father, Will ran to the door. As Will darted
through the doorway, plaintiff slammed it behind him
and refused to give Will a jacket.31 R. 3025-28.
4.
After agreeing with defendant to January and
February 1993 visitation, plaintiff "rescheduled"
defendant's visitation to coincide exactly with his
work schedule, denying him visitation until defendant
obtained relief from the Court. R. 3192.
5.
On April 14, 1993, defendant's car would not
start. He took a cab to defendant's residence, found
no one home, and returned in the cab to his own
residence. He then reached plaintiff by telephone and
offered to take another cab to pick up the children.
Plaintiff told him that visitation was cancelled
because he was more than thirty minutes late. R. 3193.
6.
On June 4, 1993, plaintiff denied defendant's
visitation by calling "911," feigning to the police
that an unknown intruder was "breaking into" her house.
R. 2833-34.
7.
On October 13, 1993, plaintiff cancelled
visitation with no notice. When defendant arrived to
pick up the children, they were simply gone. R. 3193.
This pattern of conduct, so clear, with so many

incidents, interfered with defendant's relationship with his
31

Dr. Stewart concluded that defendant, by taking Will
only, was treating him as a favored child. R. 2268. She failed
to realize that at that time the visitation order allowed defendant to take only Will on Friday nights. R. 2717.
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children.

The Court abused its discretion in failing to consider

this critical factor.
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLY
EXCLUDING IMPORTANT EVIDENCE THAT WENT TO THE
HEART OF THIS DISPUTE
Like factual findings, evidentiary rulings are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion.
(Utah 1990).

State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 939

Here the Court improperly excluded important

evidence that went to the heart of this matter32:
1.

Dr. Strassberg was not allowed to testify that Dr.

Stewart's rejection of the parties' MMPI profiles was not
consistent with the psychological profession.

R. 3158-59.

This

was critical rebuttal testimony.
2.

Defendant's testimony regarding the structure and

limits he provided the children was improperly cut short:
Question:

[T]he only thing we really talked about, as far as
structure, is the red tape, or safety rules you've
imposed. Do you feel that you create and foster a
structured, disciplined environment for your children when that's called for?

Mr. Dolowitz:

Objection, conclusion.

The Court:

The question's been answered.

Let's move along,

Mr. Woodall.
The absence of this testimony was then used as the basis of
Finding 18, that defendant does not provide structure or limits
for his children.
3.

The Court accepted as conclusive evidence a

hearsay statement that it admitted for the limited purpose of
32

The Court also allowed Dr. Stewart to testify, over
defendant's objections, as to matters of which she had no
knowledge, such as which parent imposed structure and limits on
the children (R. 3105), and on the level of parent-child bonding
at the time of trial (R. 3122).
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showing the child's "state of mind," which formed the basis for
finding 20. R. 2561.
4.

The most serious evidentiary error was the Court's

refusal to consider testimony regarding witness tampering against
defendant during the trial, which acts pointed to plaintiff:
a.

In the evening following the first day of

trial, defendant's house was broken into and his car was shot.
R. 2921. The police recovered a 9mm bullet from the door of his
automobile.

R. 2922.

A diagram had been drawn on the car of a

cupid's heart with "H.S. + A.A." written in the heart.

Defendant

had once given plaintiff a wooden plaque of a cupid's heart with
"H.S. + H.S." written in it.

"H.S." stood for "Honey Smacks," a

term of endearment used in the Baldwin household.

R. 2943.

During the marriage, plaintiff accused defendant of being
unfaithful, and she coined the term "Adolescent Angel," for the
girlfriend she imagined defendant to have.

R. 2943.

The Court

apparently concluding that defendant shot his own car:

"To

determine who, if anyone other than Dr. Baldwin, shot the gun
into that car, would require a lengthy trial."
b.

R. 3189.

On the morning of his scheduled testimony,

defendant received a threat from an anonymous telephone caller
who told him "You have said too much already.
be you, Honey Smacks."

Next time it will

R. 3188 (counsel's proffer).

The Court

also ruled this irrelevant (R. 3189):
The Court:

What proof do you have as to who made the phone
call, if it, in fact did occur?

Mr. Woodall:

Well, your honor, the proof is only in what was
said, that Dr. Baldwin would swear to under oath.
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The Court:

All right, so Dr. Baldwin would say that occurred.
Do you have anything else?

Mr. Woodall:

I have a nine millimeter slug that was retrieved
from his car.

The Court:

Is that it?

These incorrect evidentiary rulings affected at least
three of the Court's findings (findings 18, 19 and 20), requiring
a reversal of the Court's decision.

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d

116, 120 (Utah 1989).
CONCLUSION
The Court deferred to Elizabeth Stewart's sixteenmonth- old report on virtually every issue it was presented,
excluding crucial rebuttal evidence and ignoring the overwhelming
body of evidence favoring defendant as the custodial parent.
Plaintiff is a troubled person who threatened to make
her own child "sick," and she carried out this threat.
happy and normal with his father.

Will is

With his mother, who accuses

him of "victimizing" her, he has a psychiatric diagnosis and is
drugged.

He is at risk for hypertension, stunted growth and

unnecessary lifelong anxieties of being "not normal."

Barbara

and Andy are in the same environment, and subject to the same
influences.

Defendant requests an order reversing the decision

of the court below, awarding him custody of all three children,
subject to plaintiff's right of liberal visitation.
DATED this

tt>

day of March 1995.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

BARBARA K. POLICH
JftMHS H. WOODALL
Attorneys for appellant
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ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

COURT'S RULING

SUSAN NEWELL BALDWIN,

CASE NO. 924902893

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM ANDREW BALDWIN,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on October 18
through the 21st, on October 25, 1993, and, finally, on January 10,
1994•

The issues presented were, a custody determination, the

entitlement to and amount of alimony, the income of the parties,
the amount of child support, property distribution, and attorneys
fees.

Testimony was adduced, videotapes reviewed, and written

closing arguments and requests for relief of the parties were
considered.

The

Court

has

now

considered

the

testimony,

videotapes, stipulations, exhibits received, arguments of counsel
and the relevant law, and the Court rules as stated herein.

Custody
The Court awards legal and physical custody of the parties'
three minor children to the plaintiff, subject to the defendant's
liberal and reasonable rights of visitation.
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COURT'S RULING

PAGE TWO

BALDWIN V. BALDWIN

The Court in reaching this decision has considered Pusey v.
Pusev, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), and

Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52,

and other relevant law.
In arriving
considered

at a decision

the possibility

on custody

of a joint

this

custody

Court
order.

first
This

approach, which offers the children a full relationship with each
parent, is generally preferred if it is practically viable and in
the best interests of the children. However, it appears clear that
this is not an appropriate case for joint custody because of the
parties' inability to meaningfully communicate and cooperate to
meet the children's needs. The Court notes that the parents seem
to have very disparate parenting styles and a very different
assessment of the needs of the children.

They have not even been

able to agree on a diagnosis and a course of treatment for their
son, Will.
Next, the Court has considered whether there is value in
keeping the children together.

This Court generally sees keeping

siblings together as an important and necessary objective.

This

case is not exceptional in that regard. The Court finds that these
three siblings will benefit from being kept together in the same
home.

Therefore,

a custody

determination

requires that the

custodial parent be able to effectively parent all three children.
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The Court finds that the plaintiff is the most clearly capable
of providing

stability,

comfort,

belonging

all

children.

to

three

nurturance
The

and

a

plaintiff

sense of
has

been

consistently with and available to, the children from the birth of
each child.

She has been the primary caregiver of the children,

although the Court notes the defendant has been very involved in
the care of Will.

This consistent steady availability of the

plaintiff to all three children seems to this Court to be a factor
in creating and maintaining stability in the home environment. The
Court finds that, while both parents are bonded equally with Will,
a greater bond exists between the plaintiff and the two youngest
children, uhan between defendant and these children.

The Court

bases this finding upon the totality of testimony, particularly
upon Dr. Stewart's testimony.

Further, the Court has taken into

account its own observation of the parties' appearance, demeanor
and attitude as they spoke of the children and as they testified,
in general. The Court also considered the fact that the defendant
initially sought only custody of Will.

Dr. Stewart's report

stated, "Dr. Baldwin does not feel strongly about having custody of
Barbara nor of two month old Andrew and he would be agreeable to
splitting up the children with Barbara and Andrew remaining in Mrs.
Baldwin's custody and Will being in his custody".

(Ex. 1, p. 27.)
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The Court finds that Dr. Stewart is an expert in issues concerning
custody and had an opportunity to observe all three children
interact with their parents. Dr. Stewart's report, received as Ex.
1, states that: "Mrs. Baldwin has the ability to be fully involved
with one child while at the same time monitoring the other two,"
and "Mrs. Baldwin is very sensitive to the children's individual
differences and the importance of treating them equally. . . ."
(Ex. 1, p. 19.)
compelling.

The Court finds this testimony credible and

While defendant clearly loves all the children, and

has a great deal to offer these children, the Court finds that he
is not equally bonded to the three children.

Dr. Stewart clearly

opined that plaintiff would make the better custodial parent for
the three children and is strongly and equally bonded to all three.
The Court finds this testimony to be credible.
The Court carefully considered the content of the parties'
testimony and their appearance and demeanor in court, while they
were on the stand and off.

The Court observed plaintiff to be

calm, and emotionally stable throughout the trial.

Further, no

animosity was seen in the plaintiff's interaction with defendant.
The Court observed defendant to be openly antagonistic toward
plaintiff, to be frequently agitated, emotional, and less calm than
plaintiff, on each occasion that he was in court.
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The Court finds that both parents can provide the children
with an appropriate environment in which to live.

After viewing

the videotapes offered by defendant, the Court concludes that
defendant's home environment is particularly "child friendly". The
Court also notes that the defendant stimulates creative play with
his children.

The Court, however, must consider not just the

parenting skills each parent evinces with the children at present,
but also what each can offer the children as a custodial parent, in
the children's adolescent and teen years.
The plaintiff has a demonstrated ability to provide consistent
care and love and supervision of all three children.

Further, the

plaintiff can provide personal care for the children during the
day, while the defendant would have to provide surrogate care.
Again, this is consistent with Dr. Stewart's report, admitted as
Exhibit 1, and her testimony.

It should be noted that when a

court makes a custody determination, great reliance is necessarily
placed

on

an

independent

expert's

custody

evaluation.

The

evaluator in this case, Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, was agreed to by the
parties, knew neither party prior to doing the evaluation, and she
has worked in this community for many years, earning a reputation
as a credible, objective evaluator.

The Court's reliance on the

expert is necessary since this Court did not directly observe the
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parties interact with the children.

Further, this Court lacks the

expert's background in psychology and her extensive experience in
making custody observations and assessments.
However, the Court also notes that it has had an opportunity
to carefully consider the appearance and demeanor of both plaintiff
and defendant during the long hours of the trial.
inarticulable,

and

sometimes

subtle

aspects

There are many

of

appearance

and

demeanor that go into a finder of fact's assessments of things like
emotional stability.

The totality of the Court's observations has

been taken into account, in arriving at this ruling.
The custody evaluation reflects that each parent has a strong
desire

for

consistent

custody
with

recollection

of

and

a

commitment

the

Court's

the

parties'

to

parenting.

observations

of

the

testimony.

Since

This

parties

the

Court

is
and
has

concluded, based upon a plethora of indicia that this is not a case
for joint custody, this Court has also carefully considered which
parent, if given custody, would be more likely to facilitate the
visitation and interaction of the other with the children.
The Court

concludes,

after having

seen and heard

from

the

parties in court on a number of occasions, that the plaintiff is
far more likely, as custodial parent, to facilitate the childrens'
interaction with the defendant, than vice-versa.

The Court found

n i ooo
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the defendant's testimony concerning the Park City outing to be
particularly significant in this context. When defendant, enroute
to Park City, experienced problems with his vehicle, he walked some
distance in the sun/heat with the children, decided to keep the
children with him overnight and chose not to call the plaintiff
directly to seek assistance with the children, or to advise her of
where

he

and

the

children

were

and

what

his

plans

were.

Additionally, the 911 tape was considered compelling by the Court.
The content and tone of the tape reflected an alarming degree of
persistence, angry demands, intense pounding on doors and chaos, at
the home, to which the children were insensitively subjected.
While

both

parents

might

well

have

handled

this

situation

differently, keeping the best interests of the children at the
forefront of their minds, it is particularly

clear that the

defendant lost control and forgot what was best for the children.
The Court has also noted that defendant acknowledged, while on
the

stand,

that

the

plaintiff

has

been

flexible

regarding

visitation in the past.
The Court finds that plaintiff appears more likely to be able
to consistently, over time, give the children comfort, structure,
security and a sense of belonging and fitting in the world, and is
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more likely to facilitate the children's bonding with one another,
with friends and with the non-custodial parent.
The custodial parent is to make the decisions pertaining to
medical treatment of the minor children, and the non-custodial
parent must abide by those decisions, although his input is to be
considered, and the non-custodial parent must give any medications
prescribed for the children, to them, when they are visiting with
him.
Information concerning work schedules is to be exchanged by
the parties every two weeks.
work schedules in

Visitation is to be arranged with

mind.

Child Support
Child support is to be set based upon the Child Support
Guidelines, with the plaintiff's gross monthly income reflected at
$1,665, and defendant's gross monthly income at $7,968 (i.e.,
annual gross income of $95,620, divided by 12) . Defendant's income
is imputed, in part, based upon historical income and upon his own
prognosis regarding an increase in his future earnings.
This Court finds defendant has decreased his income, during
the pendency of this action, by making certain choices, including
rejecting certain employment opportunities, resulting in gross
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income for 1992 and 1993 that is dramatically reduced from previous
years.
In setting income and family support, this Court considers
that defendant has a medical degree and is licensed and experienced
as a physician with an internal medicine and a critical care
medicine specialization, and that defendant also has a juris
doctorate degree. Defendant is young (41) and enjoys good health.
The Court finds that in 1990, defendant earned $103,717, and in
1991 $98,145.
estimated

that

While no tax return was filed for 1992, defendant
he

earned

$80,000

to

$90,000

in

that

year.

Defendant was offered employment in 1992 at Wayne State University,
at the rate of $105,000 a year. Additionally, the Court finds the
defendant is extremely intelligent, licensed as both an attorney
and physician, and able to practice medicine, do arbitration or
even do forensic work.

The Court also considers that defendants

FHP salary when he quit was $96,000 a year, and defendant indicated
his annual salary was $100,000 in June 1992 (See Ex. 57).

The

Court therefore takes the average of defendant's estimated income
for 1992 ($85,000), and averages this with his income for 1991 and
1990, and sets his income at $95,620 a year.

Defendant is to pay

child support, as set forth on the guidelines, using this figure
for his income.

nnot:
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Defendant's historical income, his earning potential, and his
own statement as to his probable increased future earnings, has
been considered by the Court in arriving at defendant's income for
purposes of setting support.

Defendant is to pay one-half of the

work-related child care costs plaintiff incurs.
A child support worksheet is to be prepared by Mr. Dolowitz
and integrated into and attached to his proposed Findings and
Decree.

Alimony
The Court in fixing alimony has considered the standard set in
Willev v. Willev, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1993), and Jones
v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), and analyzed the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties, the financial condition and needs of
plaintiff, the ability of plaintiff to produce income and the
ability of defendant to provide support, including an assessment of
his living expenses.
The Court has also considered the amount of child support
defendant will be paying and plaintiff receiving.
The Court finds plaintiff's living expenses to be $4,624 (see
Exhibit 11), and the defendant's living expenses to be $2,247 (see
Ex. 51). The Court finds the parties enjoyed a very comfortable
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standard of living during the marriage, which is consistent with
the anticipated expenses.
The plaintiff is therefore awarded $1,550 a month in alimony
for a period of eight years, or until plaintiff remarries or
cohabits. The Court anticipates that with payment of this amount,
defendant can meet his expenses, and plaintiff can meet hers, with
some downward adjustment of her expenses.

Defendant's ability to

pay support is clear, based upon his earning history, his work
experience as a physician, and his education.
to

Plaintiff will have

contribute to her own income, in order to meet her needs.

Alimony is to be paid at this rate for a period of eight years.
In

determining

considered

the

the relatively

duration

of

alimony,

short

length

the

Court

has

of the marriage, the

relatively young age of the parties, and the present need for the
plaintiff to devote much of her time to the care of pre-school
children. Once the youngest child is in school, the plaintiff will
still have sufficient time to develop further job skills and
experience

and/or

seek

further

employability and earning capacity.

education

to

improve

her

It is anticipated that the

duration of alimony will be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to
become self-supporting by the time the alimony terminates.

This

alimony and child support award is effective December 1, 1993.
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Division of Personal Property
Each party is to keep what is in their possession with the
exceptions noted herein.
Defendant is awarded the chest of drawers in plaintiff's home,
currently used by the parties' son, Will. Plaintiff is awarded the
1980 Mercedes automobile and the other Mercedes is awarded to
defendant.

Additionally, if plaintiff elects to sell the 1980

Mercedes, she is to offer defendant the right to purchase that
vehicle from her at mid-blue book price.
The Court finds that the existence and/or loss of 13 round cut
diamonds and cash allegedly in the home has not been proven.

The

Court finds plaintiff's denial of knowledge of the existence of
these diamonds is credible.

Neither plaintiff, nor the marital

estate is to be charged with these diamonds or the cash.

Debts
The defendant's student loans, all incurred prior to marriage,
are to be paid by defendant.

Any cash gifts from plaintiff's or

defendant's family are excluded from the marital estate.

Attorney's Fees
Plaintiff has established a financial need for assistance in
paying fees. The Court also finds that defendant is able to assist
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Defendant is to pay

his own fees and three-quarters of plaintiff's attorney's fees.
The Court finds the fees of counsel for plaintiff were reasonable
and necessary. The Court finds that plaintiff cannot pay her fees,
without assistance, and there are no significant existing assets of
the marriage that could be used to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees.
Defendant's own circumstances and fees are such that the Court
declines to order defendant to assume the full burden.
In arriving at the finding that defendant is able to assist
plaintiff, the Court has considered that defendant has already paid
a significant amount to his attorneys for their representation, and
may well have used some marital assets (including stock) to pay
over $52,000 toward his attorney's fees.
Mr. Dolowitz is to prepare detailed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce consistent with, but
not limited to, this Ruling and consistent with the totality of
relevant testimony. These are to be submitted to opposing counsel,
who will have fifteen (15) days to file written objections to the
same.
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This Court notes it has not considered anythincfgaid at the
pretrial conference of this case.
Dated this

°^ -day of Ma

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT J

£'. "intfWaz^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this <r-

day of

March, 1994:

David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Plaintiff
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Barbara K. Polich
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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of and for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South
Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
(801) 532-2666
Attorney for Plaintiff

Third Judicial District
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

•7;

—oooOooo—

S

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SUSAN NEWELL BALDWIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

WILLIAM ANDREW BALDWIN,

Civil No. 924902893DA
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
—oooOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial, the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis presiding on October 1 8 - 2 1 , 1993, October 25, 1993, and January 10,
1994. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.
The Defendant was present in person, represented by counsel Barbara K. Polich and
James H. Woodall. The court heard and considered the testimony of the witnesses
presented by each of the parties, the exhibits received into evidence, and the arguments
of counsel, then took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, being advised in the
premises, the court made and issued its ruling in written form on the 2nd day of March,
1994 and to effect its ruling now makes and enters the following as its
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on

the 8th day of July, 1992, when this action was filed and had been so for more than
three months immediately prior thereto.
2.

The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 18th

day of September, 1987 at Las Vegas, Nevada.
3.

Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties making

continuation of their marriage relationship impossible.
4.

There were three children born as issue of this marriage, to-wit:

William Baldwin, born May 23, 1988, age 5; Barbara Baldwin, born July 31, 1991, age
2; and Andrew Baldwin, born June 29, 1992, age 1 year.
5.

Susan Baldwin has been the primary caretaker of the three minor

children throughout the marriage of the parties. She was the exclusive caretaker of Will
from his birth until Barbara's birth on July 31, 1991. Shortly after Barbara's birth when
the Plaintiff discovered she was pregnant for a third time, Defendant, at Plaintiffs
insistence began providing some care for Will. While the Defendant provided physical
care for Will in terms of playing with him and taking him with him for various activities,
he did not perform any other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning, purchasing
clothing or food, household chores, taking the children to medical appointments or other
daily activities involved in child care. The Plaintiff provided all of these services for all
three children. The Defendant at no time provided care for either Barbara or Andrew.
6. The parents seem to have very disparate parenting styles and a very
different assessment of the needs of the child.

2
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7.

After each of the children was born, Will in 1988, Barbara in 1991,

Andrew in June of 1992, the Defendant left town leaving the Plaintiff to cope by herself
with the problems of a new child, and after Barbara's birth, with children who were
already residing in the home. This occurred despite the fact that the date of each child's
birth was known in advance. The Defendant put pursuit of his own interests ahead of
those of providing care for the children (William, or William and Barbara) when Barbara
and Andrew were born.
8.

Each of the parties can provide some personal care for the children,

but it is the Plaintiff who has a history of using her time to provide personal care for the
children while the Defendant has used this time for his own pursuits.
9.

The Plaintiff is a nurse. She worked after the birth of each of her

children. She worked two shifts per week to keep certain benefits available for the family
through the Veteran's Administration after Will was born. She resumed this employment
after Barbara was born. After Andy's birth and instituting this action, she resumed work.
10.

Defendant has never provided personal care for Barbara and Andrew

for longer than a weekend which occurred during the pendency of this matter. In
addition, Defendant has, during the pendency of this matter, frequently charged his visits
as he accepted work assignments around the country. He was unable to identify a
future work schedule in court. He stated it would be unpredictable. Consequently,
Defendant's theoretical ability to provide personal care is questionable.
11.

The Defendant has never provided personal care for Barbara or

Andrew while the Plaintiff has regularly scheduled her shifts to provide custodial care for
all three children. During the pendency of the matter the Defendant would not accept
3

regularly scheduled visitation because he declared his work prohibited him from doing
so. His uncertain and irregular schedule with unpredictable times in which to provide
personal care is a pattern that continued throughout the pendency of this action. In
addition, the Plaintiff testified that when he had personal time free during the course of
the marriage, while the parties resided together, Defendant frequently used this for
research and writing rather than providing care for the children. The Defendant did not
dispute this testimony regarding his use of his time.
12.

In determining the stability of the environment provided by each

parent, the Plaintiff is clearly capable of supplying a much more stable environment than
is the Defendant.

Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the only mental health professional who

examined both the parties and their children on behalf of the court, was clear and
unequivocal in testifying that it was the Plaintiff who could provide a stable, emotional
environment for the children, not the Defendant. The behavior of the parties in the court
during the trial confirmed the information provided by Dr. Stewart. The Plaintiff remained
calm and provided information for the court. The Defendant became highly agitated and
had difficulty keeping himself under control. On occasion the court had to admonish him
or request the assistance of his counsel in keeping the Defendant under control so that
the proceedings could continue. The Plaintiff presented non-accusatory information to
the court about the experiences and parenting of the parties. The Defendant was
accusatory and attacked the Defendant. In addition, the psychological testing of the
parties, as described by the mental health professionals, as well as the clinical
observations by Dr. Stewart indicated that while people and relationships are important
to the Plaintiff, impersonal ideas are important to the Defendant. The children must be
raised in an environment where they and their relationships to their parents, their peers,

their families and each other are important. The Plaintiff is the parent who can create
an environment in which these will be emphasized, maintained and taught. These are
extremely important in the emotional stability of the environment maintained for the
children.

A custodial parent must provide comfort and security for a child and by

personal care and using friends in a social environment, the Plaintiff has given the
children an environment of adult caring.

The Defendant did not provide such an

environment and is unable to do so.
13. While Defendant clearly loves all the children and has a great deal to
offer these children, the court finds that he is not equally bonded to the three children.
Dr. Stewart clearly opined the Plaintiff would make the better custodial parent for the
three children and is strongly and equally bonded to all three. The Court finds this
testimony to be credible.
14.

The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that she is very concerned

when one parent alienates children from the other parent. She found, and the court has
determined from the testimony of the parties and their conduct in court that Dr. Stewart
correctly observed that the Defendant works to alienate the children from the Plaintiff by
fault finding, criticism and derogatory comments. On the other hand, the Plaintiff does
not engage in this behavior.
15. The Court found the defendant's testimony concerning the Park City
outing to be particularly significant in this context. When defendant, en route to Park
City, experienced problems with his vehicle, he walks in distance in the sun/heat with the
children, decided to keep the children with him overnight and chose not to call the
plaintiff directly to seek assistance with the children, or to advise her of where he and
the children were and what his plans were.
5
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16. The 911 tape was considered compelling by the Court. The content
and the tone of the tape reflected an alarming degree of persistence, angry demands,
intense poundings on the doors, and chaos, at the home, to which the children were
insensitively subjected.

While both parents might well have handled this situation

differently, keeping the best interest of the children at the forefront of their minds, it is
particularly clear that the defendant lost control and forgot what was best for the children.
17. Defendant acknowledged, while on the stand, that the plaintiff has
been flexible regarding visitation in the past.
18.

Dr. Stewart described the difference between playing with and

entertaining the children as opposed to providing every day structure and care. She
testified that the structure a care giver would give would produce more resistance from
a child than would simply playing with the child, yet this care giver providing structure
would be providing more attention to the children than someone who simply played with
the children.

The Plaintiff is aware of the problems that arise from her providing

structure for the children. The Defendant, not providing this type of structure, does not
encounter this type of difficulty. The Plaintiff provides limits for the children and this
produces conflicts. The Defendant does not.

Instead of recognizing that this is a

problem, the Defendant simply criticizes the Plaintiff to the children, which is a destabilizing factor in their lives. The lack of this criticism in the home of Mrs. Baldwin is
one of the stabilizing factors in the children's lives as it leaves them free to form an
unfettered relationship with their father. Dr. Baldwin does not permit the children this
freedom in their relationship with Mrs. Baldwin.

This conduct by Dr. Baldwin is

detrimental to the children.
19.

Will is strongly bonded with both parents. Andrew and Barbara have
6

strong bonding with the Plaintiff and weak bonding with the Defendant. The Defendant
has not demonstrated an ability to provide care and supervision in a suitable
environment for the children and meet their needs for a prolonged period of time. The
Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to provide care and supervision in a suitable
environment for the children and meet their needs throughout their lives.
20.

The Defendant attempted to involve Will in the custodial dispute. He

has advised Will that he (Will) will be placed in the Defendant's custody, thus trying to
impact Will's preference for which parent he would reside. The Plaintiff has engaged in
no such activity. This activity is considered to be seriously detrimental to Will.
21.

The law favors keeping siblings together. The Defendant initially

wanted custody of Will but not Barbara or Andy. His position changed only as he went
into trial, apparently after determining that he would not be able to successfully secure
a separation of the children. These three children should be kept together in a family
unit. The Plaintiff has sought custody of all three children throughout this action and has
constantly maintained the position that the children should be kept together in a family
unit.
22.

Dr. Stewart advised the court that she found the character and

emotional stability of Susan Baldwin as a custodial parent, greatly exceeded that of
Andrew Baldwin. No credible contrary evidence was presented to the court. The court
finds that Susan Baldwin has, in terms of her character and her emotional stability for
providing custodial care for the children, emotional stability and an ability to provide an
emotionally stable environment which greatly exceeds that of the Defendant.
23.

The Plaintiff has demonstrated throughout the lives of the children

a major commitment to custodial parenting. The Defendant has engaged in a playmate
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role with his son Will but not even that with the other children. While the Plaintiff
returned to work on a part time basis after the birth of the children, the Defendant
worked full time and utilized his spare time to conduct research for the publication of
articles rather than assisting with the children. In addition, the Defendant was, until trial,
perfectly willing, and in fact, requested the court to separate the children. The desire
and commitment for custody is clearly differentiated between the parties. The Plaintiff
has sought custody of all the children throughout these pleadings, while the Defendant
does not. In fact he advised the court in his January 10, 1994 testimony that he in
reality wanted the Plaintiff to raise Barbara and Andy until they reached school age and
then he would assume physical custody.
24.

The Defendant on several occasions created scenes that were

emotionally disturbing to the children. He physically took the children from the Plaintiff
in January of 1993 when Plaintiff did not agree to that visitation and attempted to take
them again without her agreement in June, 1993. Prior to the filing of the divorce, he
ran his bicycle into the family car, then told Will (untruthfully), who was in the car driven
by the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had hurt him and that he had to go to the hospital. Even
the Defendant's own witnesses testified that this was totally inappropriate behavior.
25.

The Defendant refused to consider the problems that Will suffers

which have been diagnosed by competent medical and psychological professionals to
be Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. The Defendant insists this does not exist,
and went to great lengths to prove that this did not exist before the court. This has
placed Will in the position of receiving input from one parent that there is a problem with
which he must deal, while the other parent denies that it exists. The need of a child
suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is for stability, predictability, and
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consistency in their environment. The Plaintiff is capable of providing this environment.
The Defendant is not. The Defendant has demonstrated an inability to accept this
diagnosis. From the court's perception, this is not an issue the court is going to decide,
nor need it decide it in terms of reaching a factual determination. It does not decide
whether or not Will suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. What the court
does find, is that the Plaintiff after consulting with appropriate medical and psychological
experts, determined that a problem existed and followed the professional advice she
received in caring for Will. Instead of working with Plaintiff (the parent having temporary
custody) the Defendant actively undermined and opposed the prescribed treatment thus
demonstrating a desire to place his own wishes ahead of the best interest of his children
even after consulting Dr. Frances Berger who tentatively confirmed the diagnosis and
tried to counsel the Defendant about his reaction to this information.
26.

Information concerning work schedules is to be exchanged by the

parties every two weeks.
27. Visitation is to be arranged with work schedules in mind.
28.

As of January 10,1994, the Plaintiff is earning $1,700.00 per month.

She is doing this working 4 shifts per week. Dr. Stewart advised her to work no more
than 2 shifts per week but because of the failure of the Defendant to provide regular,
timely support, as ordered by the court (though he was current on support through the
final day of trial in this matter of January 10, 1994), it appears she will have to work 4
shifts and the court finds that her income should be based upon the 4 shifts per week.
29.

In October of 1993, the Defendant testified that he was earning

$30.00 per hour and expected that he could earn in the neighborhood of $50,000.00 per
year working in Tooele, Utah. On January 10, 1994, Defendant testified he would be
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earning $50,000.00 - $60,000.00 per year with full time employment at InstaCare.
However, the Defendant earned $103,717.00 in 1990 and $98,145.00 in 1991. In 1992,
Defendant worked for FHP until September and he had an agreement with Wayne State
University Medical School to become a faculty member for which he would have been
paid $105,000.00 per year, to-wit: $8,750.00 per month. After the Plaintiff filed this
action, the Defendant declined to follow through with his commitment to Wayne State
University and has not worked at employment that would pay him at the rate of pay he
would have earned at Wayne State University since declining that employment.
30.

The Defendant is a medical specialist (critical care medicine, internal

medicine, family medicine). He participates in a national employment market and is
capable of employment at $105,000.00 per year in that market. He has deliberately
chosen not to pursue that employment as a result of this divorce action. In addition to
his medical specialties, he is a lawyer, licensed to practice law who has served as an
arbitrator for the courts in California. The court finds that as the Defendant himself
testified, the market in which the Defendant would be employed is a national market and
in that national market he is capable of earning $105,000.00 per year. The court further
finds that the Defendant has voluntarily chosen not to accept this employment and to
remain employed in positions where he is paid at a rate below the income that he is
capable of earning. The income that would have been paid to Defendant by Wayne
State University is comparable to that which he would have earned had he continued to
work with FHP, his employer at the time this action commenced.

The Defendant

voluntary terminated his contract with FHP and voluntarily chose not to accept the
offered employment at Wayne State University.
31.

The court heard the Defendant testify that the prevailing earnings for
10
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persons of his background in the national community is in the range the Defendant was
being paid by FHP and Wayne State University. While employment in these specialties
might not be immediately available to Defendant in the area of Salt Lake City, Utah, it
is available to him in the national market in which he qualifies. The Defendant has
voluntarily chosen not to participate in the market for which he is qualified and thus is
voluntarily earning wages below those that he is capable of earning.
32.

The Plaintiff has a need for income based upon living expenses for

herself and her children of $4,624.00 per month. (See Exhibit II) By application of the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of Utah, finding the Plaintiff has a monthly
income of $1,700.00 per month and the Defendant should have imputed income to him
of $7,968.00 per month, the Defendant should pay child support to the Plaintiff in the
sum of $1,467.00 per month, thus leaving Plaintiff an unmet need of $3,157.00 per
month. (See attached worksheet.)
33.

The Defendant, counting his imputed income, has income of

$7,968.00 per month, and has a need of $2,247.00 per month for his own living
expenses. (See Exhibit 51) He is capable of paying alimony to meet the need of the
Plaintiff of $1,550.00 per month as alimony. This is below the full need of the Plaintiff
for alimony but is consistent with meeting her need after considering her earnings and
Defendant's ability to pay support in light of the standard of living maintained by the
parties during their marriage and the needs of each of the parties to support their own
living expenses.
34. The parties enjoyed a very comfortable standard of living during the
marriage, which is consistent with the anticipated expenses.
35. Defendant's ability to pay support is clear, based upon his earning
11
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history, his work experience as a physician and his education.
36. Plaintiff will have to contribute to her own income in order to meet her
needs.
37. The Court has considered the relatively short length of the marriage,
the relatively young age of the parties, and the present need for the plaintiff to devote
much of her time to the care of preschool children. Once the youngest child is in school,
plaintiff will still have sufficient time to develop further job skills and experience and/or
seek further education to improve her employability and earning capacity.
38. Each party has personal property in his or her possession. Plaintiff
has in her possession certain personal property and has in her possession a chest of
drawers.
39. Defendant has in his possession certain personal property.
40.

The Plaintiff in her household is making use of a set of drawers,

which the Defendant owned prior to marriage. They are being used by Will for his
clothes. The Defendant has requested that this set of drawers be returned to him.
41.

The parties own two Mercedes automobiles. The Defendant has

requested that both of them be awarded to him.
42.

The Defendant claims that there are 13 round cut diamonds which

having a value of $40,000.00 and $8,020.00 in cash which he left in the house, which
are missing. He claims that they were buried in the yards of homes in which the parties
resided during their marriage, but that they were in his study when he left the marital
home. The Plaintiff denies any knowledge of these items.
43.

The Defendant has liabilities of approximately $18,000.00 in student

loans incurred prior to the marriage of the parties.

12
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44.

The Plaintiff received a cash gift of $20,000.00 from her parents.

The Defendant claims this is a marital asset. The Defendant claims that as a gift from
her parents, it is her separate property.
45.

The Defendant claims an inheritance of $58,000.00 from his mother.

He asserts this is a non-marital asset. He also related that he received cash from his
grandmother totaling $23,000.00 in gifts given in the fall of 1987, 1988, and 1989. It was
the claim of the Defendant that this money was placed in various securities and trust
accounts for the children. At the time of trial, all of these monies had been expended.
46.

Defendant has advised this court through his Financial Declaration

dated January 4, 1993 that he has in force and effect a life insurance policy with First
International Life Insurance in the face amount of $750,000.00.
47.

The Plaintiff has requested that the Defendant pay the costs and

attorney's fees incurred by her. The Defendant had paid more than $52,000.00 for his
own attorney's fees which he testified exceeded $100,000.00. The Plaintiff has paid
approximately $8,000.00 on her attorney's fees, which at the time of trial were estimated
to be $71,000.00 but were subject to additions as post-trial proceedings would be
expected.
48.

The attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff are reasonable and

necessary. They include charges for a legal assistant who worked with and under the
supervision of counsel for the Plaintiff. The work done by the legal assistant would have
to have been performed by an attorney had it not been done by her. Counsel for the
Plaintiff limits his practice to family law and bills at a rate of $175.00 per hour. By using
the assistance of Frances Terrill, the legal assistant, for whom counsel bills $55.00 per
hour, counsel for Plaintiff provided representation for the Plaintiff at a cost of $113.26 per

hour which is below the rate customarily charged for equivalent services in this area.
In addition the court finds the Defendant has expended a higher sum for his legal
representation than has the Plaintiff. Finally, the court finds the Plaintiff is in need of
assistance in paying her attorney's fees as she does not have either the resources or
earning capacity of Defendant to meet them and the high costs of this action.
49.

Defendant's own circumstances and fees are such that the Court

declines to order defendant to assume the full burden.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties, their children, William

Baldwin, born May 23, 1988, age 5; Barbara Baldwin, born July 31, 1991, age 2; and
Andrew Baldwin, born June 29, 1992, age 1 year, and the subject matter of this action.
2.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce which should become

final upon entry.
3.

Legal and physical custody of the parties' three minor children should

be awarded to the Plaintiff, subject to the Defendant's liberal and reasonable rights of
visitation.
4. Legal and physical custody of the parties1 three minor children should
be awarded to the Plaintiff and subject to the defendant's reasonable rights of visitation.
Information containing work schedules is to be exchanged by the parties every two
weeks. Visitation is to be arranged with work schedules in mind.
5.

As the Plaintiff has been awarded the care, custody and control of

the minor children of the parties, the Defendant should be enjoined and prohibited from
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interfering with, undermining, or changing the medical care arrangements she has made
for the children except for medical emergencies occurring when the children are visiting
the Defendant.
6.

The court determines that child support should be set based upon

the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines, with the Plaintiffs gross monthly income
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reflected at $1,665.00 and Defendant's gross monthly income at $7,968.00, to-wit: $
$1,467.00 per month.
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^ r r 7 he Plaintiff shoiffd be awarded alimony in the amount of $1,550.00

per month for a period of eight years, or until Plaintiff remarries or cohabits. The
alimony and child support award is effective December 1, 1993.
8.

Each party should be awarded the personal property presently in

their possession with the exceptions of the chest of drawers in Plaintiffs home currently
used by the parties' son, Will.
9.

Plaintiff should be awarded the 1980 Mercedes automobile and the

other Mercedes is awarded to the Defendant. If, however, Plaintiff elects to sell the 1980
Mercedes, she is to offer Defendant the right to purchase that vehicle from her at midblue book price. If he declines to buy it, she may sell it and use the proceeds of sale.
If title to the car is not in her name, Defendant should be ordered to transfer that to her
and if he refuses to do so, the title should be transferred by the Decree of Divorce.
10.

Neither Plaintiff, nor the marital estate, is to be charged with the

existence and/or loss of 13 round cut diamonds and cash allegedly in the home as the
existence of these diamonds and cash have not been proven.
11.

Defendant should be ordered to pay his student loans, which were

all incurred prior to the marriage.
15
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12. Defendant should be ordered to maintain in full force and effect as long
as child support and alimony is in effect the life insurance policy with First International
Life Insurance with a face amount of $750,000 and to list the Plaintiff as the beneficiary
thereon.
13.

Any cash gifts from Plaintiffs or Defendant's family are excluded

from the marital estate.
14. Each party should be awarded the personal property presently in their
possession with the exception of the chest of drawers which was in plaintiffs home
which shall be awarded to defendant.
15.

Defendant should be ordered to assist Plaintiff with payment of her

attorney's fees, as well as paying his own. This court finds that fees of counsel for
Plaintiff are reasonable and necessary. Consequently, Defendant should be ordered to
pay three-quarters of Plaintiffs attorney's fees. These shall be set by subsequent order
after the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree are finalized by the court,
counsel for Plaintiff shall file a cost bill and from that the court will set the attorney's fees
and costs, including expert witness costs, to be ordered paid by Defendant.

16
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94.

BY THE COURT:

•X/)>
LESLIE A. LEWIS, DISTRfcTXJOURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND
CONTENT:

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counj
for Plaintiff

BARBARA K. POLICH, Counsel
for Defendant.

17

ntJKH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this ^ 7

day of July,

1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to the following individual:
Barbara K. Polich
James H. Woodall
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Ste. 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Defendant
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